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1.  Introduction
Unemployed  workers  in the Philippines,  as  elsewhere,  are struggling  to make  ends
meet. If faced with the job loss, workers employed in the formal sector rely on severance pay.
Despite  their  entitlement,  it may  sometimes  be  difficult  for  them  to  enforce  the  payment.
Responding  to  more  dramatic  and  uninsurable  episodes  of economic  and  environmental
shocks, the  government  has also repeatedly  introduced  temporary  loan assistance  packages.
But these  workers  are  in the  minority.  Little  protection  is available  to the worker  in  non-
regular employment- and for the majority of workers, those working in the informal sector.
It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that Filipino  workers  have  relied  greatly  on  informal
modes  of managing  the  unemployment  risk:  trying  to prevent  the  risk by working  longer
hours  or  accepting  lower  pay;  mitigating  the  risk  by  prior  accumulation  of savings;  and
coping with the risk by receiving private transfers,  selling assets, withdrawing  children from
school, and - not just for a few of them - reducing consumption.  Many of these mechanisms
were costly, inefficient, and above  all, not nearly adequate.  Clearly it is an important purpose
to  assess  how  public  policy  can  better  assist  Filipino  workers  dealing  with  the  risk  of
unemployment.
The purpose  of this paper is to explore possible ways to improve income support  for
the unemployed.  Based  on the  analysis  of several  existing  as well  as potentially  attractive
income support programs, the paper outlines some of the desirable directions.  These include
selective expansion and improvement  of the design of some of the existing programs (such as
public  works,  particularly  those  that  use  labor  intensively,  and  some  types  of livelihood
programs),  as well  as the  introduction  of new programs,  such as unemployment  insurance
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to thank the Philippines authorities for their hospitality and help during the field work.savings  accounts  or comprehensive  savings  accounts,  which would  increase the coverage of
workers  and  the  range  of  contingencies  covered.  The  study  also  finds  that  some  other
programs  that  are  widely  used  in  developed  countries  (unemployment  assistance,  for
example)  may be less appropriate for countries like the Philippines.
The paper  is organized as follows.  The  next section lays out the comprehensive  risk
management  framework  that  guides  the  analysis.  Section  3  examines  country-specific
circumstances,  to the extent that they are important  determinants  of the choice of the income
support  program,  such  as labor  market  institutions,  characteristics  of the  unemployed,  and
perennial  causes  of unemployment  and underemployment.  Section  4  is the  key  analytical
section.  It  describes  alternative  income  support programs  and  discusses  arguments  in their
favor, as well as their weakness.  Section 5 concludes with a discussion of policy options.
2.  Analytical Framework'
In this section, we present the conceptual issues in evaluating various income support
programs  available  to  workers  - and the  society  as  the  whole  - to  deal  with the  risk of
unemployment.  We  start  with  stating  the  objectives  of income  support  systems.  We  then
proceed  by pointing  out that public income  support  schemes for the unemployed  are just a
subset of risk management mechanisms, and that only by observing the system in its entirety
enables  one to objectively  evaluate different  alternatives.  We conclude by listing two  types
of evaluation criteria of income support programs:  performance  evaluation criteria (stressing
distributive  and  efficiency  aspects),  and  design  and  implementation  criteria  (stressing
country's specific conditions as factors for the selection of a program).
(a) Objectives of income support programs.  From the standpoint  of individuals,  the
primary purpose  of such programs  is a replacement  of income due to  a loss  of a job.  This
purpose  subsumes  consumption  smoothing,  as  well  as  poverty  prevention.  Moreover,
maintaining  and  acquiring  human  capital,  and  countering  psychological  effects  of
unemployment are also important individual level objectives.
From the standpoint of the society, the objectives are wider and may include:
*  promoting distributive justice  (reducing income inequalities, helping the poor and
long-term unemployed);
'This  section draws from Vodopivec  (2001).
2*  encouraging restructuring  and reallocation of labor; and
*  developing  social  infrastructure  and creating  capacity for self-help  (empowering
of communities).
(b) A  general  framework of risk management.  It has  to  be emphasized  that public  income
support  programs  are  just  a  subset  of  risk  management  mechanisms  available  to  the
unemployed.  In general, these mechanisms  can be divided into three categories:  (i)  those that
reduce  the  risk  of unemployment  or  loss  of livelihood  (that  is,  reduce  the  probability  of
becoming  unemployed);  (ii)  those  that  mitigate  that  risk  (reduce  the  impact  of a  future
unemployment spell if it happens); and (iii) those applied in response to the undesirable  event
- coping mechanisms.  (See Holzmann  and Jorgensen, 2000, for a comprehensive  framework
of social  protection  based  on  social  risk management).  Within  all  three  categories,  both
informal and formal mechanisms  are usually available,  with formal  ones further divided into
market-based  and public (see table 2. 1).
Table 2.1:  Income  support systems  for unemployed  workers in the context of
other mechanisms  for managing risk*
Arrangement  IfomlFormal
Strategies  norma  Market Based  Public
Risk reduction  Less risky production.  Training.  Sound macroeconomic  policies.
Migration.  Financial market literacy.  Public health policy.
Proper feeding and  Company-based  and  Labor market policies  (including
weaning practices.  market-driven labor  employment protection policies -
Maintaining good health.  standards.  severance  pay,  for example).
Risk mitigation
(a) Portfolio  Multiple jobs.  Investment in multiple  Multi-pillar pension systems.
diversification  Investment  in human,  financial assets.  Asset transfers.
physical  and real assets.  Microfmance schemes.  Protection of property rights.
Investment in social  Support for extending financial
capital (rituals, reciprocal  markets to the poor.
gift-giving).
(b) Insurance  Marriage/family.  Old-age  annuities.  Unemployment
Community arrangements.  Disability, accident and  insurance/assistance.
Sharecrop tenancy.  other personal insurance.  Individual savings  accounts.
Crop, fire and other  Pensions (including  early
damage  insurance.  retirement),  disability,  and
sickness insurance.
Risk coping  Selling of real assets.  Sale of financial assets.  Social assistance.
Borrowing from  Commercial  loans.  General  subsidies.
neighbors.  Active  labor market programs
Intra-community  (job-search  assistance, training,
transfers/charity.  employment  subsidies,  public
Child labor.  works).
Dis-saving in human  Social funds.
I  capital.
Source:  Adapted  from Holzmann  and Jorgensen  (2000).
3*Major mechanisms used to manage the risk of unemployment  are shown in bold.
The above  framework  makes  clear not only  that there  are multiple mechanisms  for
dealing with  the  risk of unemployment.  It  also  shows that  when evaluating  the  effects of
public  income  support  programs  or  considering  the  introduction  of new  ones,  there  are
complex  links and interactions  that have to  be considered.  For example,  strengthening  of a
particular  income  support  program  for  the  unemployed  may  have  numerous,  far-reaching
consequences,  ranging  from  encouraging  production  in more  risky  industries,  reducing  the
use of self-protection  mechanisms of individuals (for example,  intensity of job search, desire
to take  training,  and incentives  for saving),  to the  amount  of private  transfers  they receive.
But  links  are  even  more  complicated.  The  financing  of public  income  support  programs
requires taxes and/or contributions  - and may thus negatively affect  the overall job creation
capacity of the  economy.  Therefore,  increased use of a particular risk mitigation mechanism
may worsen  the  effectiveness  of other risk-reducing  mechanisms  - and may  affect  coping
mechanisms as well.2
(c)  Evaluation criteria. When  a  country  is  improving  or  introducing  a  particular
program to respond to income  loss, one can use two important sets of criteria (although they
are interconnected,  it is helpful to state them separately):  performance criteria and design and
implementation criteria.
One can distinguish four types of performance evaluation criteria:
*  distributive criteria,  relating to the coverage,  the adequacy of support (as measured
by  replacement  rates,  consumption  smoothing,  and  poverty  reduction),  and  the
redistribution of income;
*  efficiency  criteria  (intensity  of job-search  effort,  effects  on  post-unemployment
wages,  effects  on  equilibrium  labor market  outcomes,  enhancing  restructuring  of
enterprises and overall adjustment, effects on labor supply of other family members,
encouragement  of taking  regular  vs.  informal  jobs,  and  effects  on  output  and
growth);
*  susceptibility  to various types of economic shocks; and
*  vulnerability to political interference during the design and execution of programs.
2  For example, in a well-known study, Cox and Jimenez (1995) estimate that the introduction of Ul in
Philippines could displace  a striking 91  percent of private transfers to the unemployed.
4Design and implementation criteria.  While  the above  criteria  determine  "generic"
performance  of various  programs,  country-specific  circumstances  determine  how  a certain
program works in a particular country.  These circumstances  relate, for example, to the type
of unemployment risk typically faced by a country, the degree of informality of the economy
and other  "initial  conditions,"  and expected  interactions  of income  support  programs  with
other programs and policies.
To illustrate: in a country where  certain regions are often affected by natural disasters,
it is important  to have  income support programs  in store  which are flexible  and can quickly
be  deployed  in  affected  areas.  Moreover,  the  presence  of a large  informal  sector  calls  for
stronger  representation  of programs  accessible  also  for  self-employed  and  other  informal
sector workers.  Furthermore,  when choosing a program,  a country's administrative  capacity
has  to  be  accounted  for.  For  example,  unemployment  insurance/assistance  requires  that
benefit  recipients  are  monitored  for their  compliance  to  continuing  eligibility  rules,  and
unemployment  assistance  relies also  on means  and asset testing.  The performance  of such
programs depends crucially on the administrative capacity to provide quality monitoring and
testing.  And interactions  with other programs and policies are also important.  For example,
if unemployment  insurance savings accounts are also meant to be an important supplement to
old-age income support programs, incentives should be purposely inscribed in both programs
to  preclude  scenarios  where  the  unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts  are  depleted  in
anticipation  of forbearance  and  generosity on the part of the main leg of the old-age  income
support system.
Last but not least, the ability of an economy to implement income redistribution  may
also determine the  choice of programs.  In varying  degrees, income  support programs  entail
redistribution  from the rich to the poor.  Depending  on the  level of economic  development,
the ability of countries to support such programs varies a lot.  Some countries are so poor that
they  can  hardly  afford  any  type  of income  support  programs.  On the  other  hand,  many
developed  economies  have  instituted  income  support  programs  that  allow  for  substantial
income redistribution.
3.  Institutional Background: Exploring Country-Specific  Conditions
As  emphasized  above,  country-specific  circumstances  determine  in many important
ways the  performance  of public income  support programs  and their interactions  with other
5risk  management  mechanisms.  This  section  is  devoted  to  the  exploration  of  such
circumstances  in the Philippines.
3.1  Regulations  about employment  and income stability
Regulations on hiring and dismissal.  The  Labor Code mandates  a probation of six
months; after that time, a worker should  be considered  a regular  employee.  The Code also
stipulates "objective  rules" for determining regular employment  - it requires that employees
who  have  been engaged  in activities  which  are "usually necessary  or desirable  in the usual
business or trade of the employer" are deemed regular workers.  Moreover, in case of "labor-
only  contracting,"  workers  are  regarded  as  directly  employed.  The  Secretary  of Labor  and
Employment  is empowered  to issue regulations  to restrict or prohibit  the contracting  out of
labor to protect  the rights of workers  established  under this  Code.  These rules tend to limit
the mode through which small and medium industries  can create jobs.
Regulations  on dismissal  require that the employer does not terminate the  service of
employees except for a just cause  or when authorized by labor law.  In case of redundancy,
the worker is entitled  to a separation pay of one  month pay for every year of service.  In the
case of retrenchment  to prevent losses,  the entitlement  is one-half month pay for every year
of service (with a minimum of one month  pay). The average severance  pay during the crisis
was around P1  0,000 (administrative  sources).  In the event of bankruptcy  or liquidation of an
employer's business,  the workers shall enjoy first preference  as regards their wages and other
monetary claims.  Such unpaid wages and monetary claims shall be paid in full before claims
of the government and other creditors may be paid.
Regulation of working hours.  The normal  working  hour shall  not exceed  8 hours  a
day and 25 percent additional compensation should be paid for overtime work.  Recently, the
judiciary upheld the right of employers to reduce work hours in times of crises.  A company
suffering  from financial  losses  is to undertake  measures  to reduce  working  days  if such  is
justified  by the financial  conditions of the  company.  The company,  however,  is required  to
notify the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) in advance, and
to submit a financial  statement.  Part-time work is increasingly  being recognized  as a reality
- but the ambiguity of labor legislation regarding  part-time work still exists.  This ambiguity
relates to the applicability of rules about job security, minimum wages, and overtime pay.
6Minimum wages.  Minimum  wage rates for agricultural  and non-agricultural  workers
are  determined  by  the  Regional  Tripartite  Wages  and  Productivity  Board.  The  Regional
Board  should  follow  the  guidelines  prescribed  by  the  National  Wage  and  Productivity
Commission and consider in its decisions, among others, regional  consumer price indices and
costs of living. The minimum wages may have significantly affected the wage setting, as they
are used as entry wages - although  only 74 percent of the inspected  establishments  complied
with the regulations.
Implications  for the choice of income support  programs. The Philippine  Labor Code
favors indefinite,  full-time  labor  contracts and protects  regular employment.  Although there
has been no empirical  analysis on its effects, international experiences  suggests that its likely
effects are (OECD,  1999):
*  lower  aggregate  employment  rate,  particularly  the  employment  rate  among  the
youth,
*  higher level of self-employment,  and
*  lower inflow into unemployment, but also longer average unemployment duration.
This  traditional  approach  is  to  be  contrasted  with  an  alternative  approach  that
emphasizes  job  creation  and  easier  access  to  formal  sector jobs  among  less  privileged
segments of the population.  That approach  requires greater labor market flexibility,  as well
as  strengthening  income  replacement  programs  to  provide  protection  for workers  in their
transition from one job to another.
3.2  Who are the unemployed?
Unemployment  in the Philippines is higher than in other Asian countries.  In the 1990s,
the unemployment rate has been around  10 percent, and has increased during the Asian crisis
(see table  3.1).  Unemployment  is even  higher  among  young workers,  particularly  women
(see table 3.2). Interestingly, the unemployment  rate is highest in the National  Capital Region.
In  1998, at the height of the Asian Financial  Crisis,  193,000 or 22.2 percent of unemployed
had  been  unemployed  for  more  than  10  weeks.  The  average  duration  of unemployment
among those looking  for work was 6.8 weeks.  The majority of long-term unemployed  (58.4
percent) were from Metro Manila and the areas closest to it.
7Table 3.1:  Summary labor market statistics, 1992-2000
(absolute numbers in million)
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
A. Employment
TOTAL employment  23.8  24.4  25  25.7  27.1  27.9  28.0  29.0  28.4
a. Wage and salary  10.6  10.8  11.3  11.9  12.6  13.5  13.7  13.8  13.9
workers  .
Public sector  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.2
Private sector  8.8  8.9  9.4  9.8  10.6  11.3  11.5  12.0
Private  HH  na  na  na  na  na  1.4  1.6  1.6
Establishment  na  na  na  na  na  9.7  9.7  10.2
Family op. ac.  na  na  na  na  na  0.2  0.2  0.2
b. Own accountworkers  9.5  9.7  9.8  10.0  10.3  10.4  10.5  10.2  10.2
Self-employed  8.7  9.0  9.0  9.1  9.3  9.3  9.5  9.4
Employer  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.4
c. Unpaid fain.  memb.  3.7  3.9  3.9  3.8  4.2  4.0  3.8  3.8  3.3
Structure by sectors (in  percent)
Agriculture  45.3  45.7  45.1  43.4  42.8  40.8  39.2  38.9  37.1
Manufacturing  10.6  10.1  10.1  10.2  9.9  9.9  9.7  9.9  10.0
Other  industries  Na  5.5  5.7  5.9  6.4  6.8  6.7  6.33  6.23
Services**  Na  38.7  39.1  40.5  40.9  42.5  44.4  44.9  46.7
Number  4.9  5.3  5.4  5.1  5.7  6.1  6.1  6.1  5.9
underemployed***
Rate of  20.0  21.7  21.4  20.0  21.0  22.1  21.8  22.1  21.7
underemploym. *  *  *  *
Rate of underempl. - men  25.0  23.5  23.4  21.8  23.0  24.0  24.0  25.1
Rate of underempl. - 17.0  18.4  18.0  16.9  17.7  18.8  18.0  17.6
women
B. Unemployment
Number of unemployed  2.6  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.5  2.6  3.1  3.1  3.5
Unemployment rate  9.9  9.3  9.5  9.5  8.6  8.7  10.1  9.8  11.2
Men  8.9  8.4  8.8  8.9  7.9  8.1  9.7  9.5
Women  11.5  10.7  10.6  10.7  9.7  9.8  10.9  9.9
C.  Labor force
Total labor force  26.3  26.9  27.7  28.4  29.7  30.3  31.1  32.1  31.8
Labor force participation  66.0  65.6  65.5  65.8  66.7  66.3  66.1  66.6  65.0
Rate (%)
LFP rate for men  83.9  83.0  83.0  83.0  83.5  83.5  83.3  83.4
LFP rate  for women  48.5  48.4  48.2  |  48.5  49.8  49.3  49.2  48.5
D. Working age  39.8  41.0  42.2  43.2  44.6  45.8  47.0  48.2  49.0
population  II  I  I  l _  l 
Source:  Yearbook of Labor Statistics,  Bureau of Labor and Employment  Statistics,  Department  of Labor and
Employment, various  issues.
*Other industries include mining and quarrying;  construction  and electricity, gas and water
8Table 3.2: Unemployment  and unemployment  rate by age and sex,  1998
Total  Male  Female
Total  3,143  10.1  1,875  9.7  1,268  10.9
15-19 Years  768  22.8  440  20.6  327  26.5
20-24 Years  807  19.9  463  17.9  344  23.2
25-34 Years  708  9.3  436  8.9  272  10.2
35-44 Years  350  5.1  210  5.0  140  5.3
45-54 Years  244  5.0  156  5.4  88  4.5
55-64 Years  165  5.7  106  6.0  59  5.1
65 Years and over  106  7.5  64  7.3  39  7.2
Source: Labor Force Survey,  1998.
The peculiarity of developing  countries  like the Philippines is that unemployment  is
more common among non-poor workers, that is, members of more prosperous households are
more than proportionally  represented  in the ranks of the unemployed.  For example,  in 1997,
of the  households  whose  heads  were  not  employed  only  12.1  percent  were  poor,  in
comparison  to  a  25  percent  poverty  incidence  in  general  (Balisacan,  1999).  Moreover,
although  the same  group  of households  whose  heads  were  not  employed represented  12.7
percent of the total population,  its contribution to the total number of poor persons was only
6.1  percent.  It  therefore  seems  that  given  the  country's  present  level  of  economic
development,  members of less prosperous households cannot afford to stay unemployed for a
prolonged  period  of time.  They  try  to  cushion  the  loss  of earnings  by  opting  for  low
productivity jobs instead of not working  at all while they continue to pursue more adequate
job opportunities.
The  above  conclusions  are  confirmed  also  by  labor  market  trends  during  the  1998
economic  crisis.  The  labor market  shock affected  richer households  more  severely both  in
terms of losses of jobs and reduced earnings (in contrast,  the drought brought by El Nino was
regressive  - that is, it affected more of the relatively  poorer, peasant households - see World
Bank, 2000).
Underemployment. A  characteristic  of Philippine  poverty  is  that  the  most deprived
groups  are  found  among  the  ranks  of the  underemployed  (that  is,  among  the  employed
persons who desire to work additional  hours  in their present or other job, or to have a new
job with longer hours).  These are mostly unskilled  workers, whose pay is often insufficient
for their needs  and  who  therefore  search  for additional  sources  of income.  Self-employed
subsistence farmers and fishers, seasonal workers,  and informal-sector workers - regarded  as
among  the poorest  - are  among  them.  In contrast  to  unemployment,  underemployment  is
9much  more  evenly  distributed  across  the  different  areas.  The  underemployment  rate  is
lowest  in  Metro  Manila  and  its  neighboring  areas  (BLES,  1998).  Results  by  Alba  and
Esguerra (1999) suggest that a worker on average would prefer to be fully employed until his
unemployment  income  exceeds  P9,000,  a  wage  way  above  the  poverty  line  and  above
average  incomes  in the formal sector,  before opting  for unemployment  as a preferred mode
of labor force participation.
The size of the informal sector. By several accounts, the informal sector is large in the
Philippines.  In  1998, more than half - 51  percent  - of the Filipino workers  worked  in the
informal sector (defined as own account workers and unpaid family members - see table  3.1).
Wage  earners employed  in  private establishments  comprised  only 35 percent  of the
total number of workers  (42 percent if wage  earners in the public sector are  accounted  for).
Moreover,  80 percent of workers employed in private establishments were  employed in firms
with less than ten workers. And among 2 million workers  in private establishments  with ten
workers  or  more,  at  least  20  percent  are  in  what  the  labor  department  calls  non-regular
employment.  Moreover,  in 1997 only a little over one-fourth,  or 525 thousand workers, were
covered by collective  bargaining agreements.
Implications for  program choice  and design.  The  above  facts  have  important
implications for both the efficiency and  equity aspects  of income support  programs.  First, a
large informal sector underscores the importance  of programs accessible  also for non-regular
workers.  Second,  the  informal  sector  offers  an  important  opportunity  for  exit  from
unemployment,  the  exit that  should not  be blocked  by the  introduction  of income  support
schemes.  Third,  equity  considerations  suggest  that  the  underemployed  - not  only  the
unemployed - should be regarded  as an important potential client  group for income support
programs.  Fourth,  providing  income  support  to  the families  of the long-term  unemployed
may, paradoxically,  increase  inequity because  it is likely to exclude those  unemployed  who
cannot "afford"  to  wait for "suitable"  employment  opportunities,  and  who are  even poorer
than the  long-term  unemployed.  And fifth,  the  widespread  nature of poverty  suggests  that
programs  should  avoid  spreading  resources  too thinly  and, therefore,  should target  specific
groups.  To achieve this goal, self-selection via a low wage should be an important method of
the selection of program participants.
103.3. Inter-household  transfers
In the Philippines,  income transfers between families are  very significant.  Cox and Jimenez
(1995) showed that in 1988, transfers  generally flowed from rich to poor households and they
accounted  for  12  percent of the  overall  income  of households.  Urban  households  in  the
lowest  quintile  benefited  most  - their  income  increased  by  80  percent  as  a  result  of the
transfers. Absent these private transfers,  income poverty rates would have been a third higher.
According  to our  calculations  based  on the  1997  Family Incomes  and  Expenditures  Survey
(FIES),  total  income transferred  in  1997 has decreased to 9 percent of the overall  income of
household,  compared  to  12 percent  in  1988.  Still, for households  receiving  such transfers in
1997,  which  was  42  percent  of the  population,  the  average  amount  received  was  large
compared  to  any public  program  and  ranged  between  a P12,000  average  for the  receiving
households  in the  ARMM  region and  P46,000 for  those in  Metro  Manila  (table 3.3).  As  a
proportion  of household  incomes  of recipient  households,  the  transfers  amounted  to  an
average  of more  than  20  percent  of income  for  recipients  in  11  of the  16  administrative
regions of the country  (not shown in table).
Table 3.3:  Dimensions of inter-household  income  transfers
Region  Percentage of  Average amount (P)  Total amount (P) of assistance  given
families  received by  by other households (per year,  in
receiving  individual households  thousand pesos) on the basis of
assistance from  that receive  Domestic  Foreign income
other households  assistance  from other  income sources  sources
(scope)  households
(intensity)
I  Ilocos Region  63.59  25,054  2,245,328  10,149,031
2  Cagayan Valley  34.49  18,983  1,152,499  2,691,706
3 Central Luzon  52.98  27,341  4,119,138  16,682,019
4  Southem Luzon  44.13  29,602  4,472,120  20,851,415
5 Bicol Region  49.31  12,390  2,979,835  2,939,935
6  Western Visayas  52.10  20,928  4,223,897  9,404,539
7  Central Visayas  41.50  16,865  2,530,020  4,792,162
8 Eastern  Visayas  43.70  13,531  2,132,132  2,310,749
9  Western Mindanao  27.58  19,890  726,045  2,327,907
10 Northern  Mindanao  30.81  13,880  837,221  1,421,416
11  Southern Mindanao  36.06  15,732  1,371,413  3,680,199
12 Central  Mindanao  26.08  15,843  564,242  1,293,027
13 NCR  49.19  46,194  8,834,560  36,426,395
14 CAR  32.56  29,643  539,328  1,961,112
15 ARMM  13.88  11,638  124,197  451,086
116CARAGA  40.35  14,463  1,103,088  1,259,110
PHILIPPINES  43.94  37,995,064  118,641,809
Source:  Own computations  based on 1997 Filipino Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES).
I1The scope  and intensity of inter-household  transfers  was uneven  across regions, and
does  not  seem  to  vary  systematically  with  the  degree  of urbanization  of the  region.  The
scope of transfers of Metro Manila and backward Bicol region, for instance, is the same at 49
percent  of households.  Meanwhile,  the  scope  of transfers  in  the  Ilocos  region,  which  is
predominantly  agricultural,  is surprisingly the highest at 63  percent.  Table  3.3  shows that in
1997, the  scope  and intensity of inter-household  transfers  were uneven across regions,  with
more redistribution  occurring  in urban areas.  Moreover, the  table shows that transfers from
abroad  made up three-fourths  of total transfers,  up from two-thirds  in  1988.  The Philippines
therefore  have  a "diversified"  portfolio  of inter-household  transfers,  one  with the  potential
for  avoiding  the  usual  covariance  of risk  that  comes  with  informal  modes  of coping  and
insurance.
Using  detailed  data  on  gifts,  loans,  and  asset  sales,  Fafchamps  and  Lund  (1997)
investigate  how rural  Filipino  households  deal  with  income  and  expenditure  shocks.  They
find that transfers are triggered by the contingency of a shock (such  as loss of work or failure
of crop),  and they claim that the system is best described  as a system of quasi-credit.  In this
system, mutual insurance  is provided by tightly knit networks of friends and relatives through
flexible,  zero-interest  informal  loans,  combined  with pure  transfers.  Mutual  insurance  does
not appear to take place at the village level; rather,  households receive help primarily through
networks  of friends  and  relatives.  This  highlights  the  possibility  that  even  the  familiarity
provided by living closely together in the same areamay not suffice to provide reliable modes
of monitoring need and ability and willingness to reciprocate  in the future.  Loans  are taken
for consumption  purposes.  Most borrowers  and  lenders  have  exchanged  loans  before,  and
many  have  switched  roles  in  the  transaction.  Indeed,  having  provided  transfers  to  other
households  entitles  the provider  to call  on the support  of the  borrower  once  (s)he,  in  turn,
requires  support.  Few loans  require  collateral  or have  a set  repayment  schedule,  and  loan
contracts  are  rarely  interlinked  with  other  contracts.  The  majority  of  informal  loans,  80
percent, carry no interest charge.
Other  findings  of Fafchamps  and  Lund  (1997)  reject  models  of risk  sharing  that
portray  informal  lending  as  an  efficient  mix  of perfectly  enforceable  credit  and  insurance
contracts.  Such gifts and loans on average  cover the  expenses associated  with funerals and
with the loss of earnings  resulting from  unemployment of the household head or his spouse.
12According  to econometric  tests, full insurance  cannot be rejected at the one percent level for
funerals  and  for  unemployment  of the head  or  spouse,  but  it can  be  rejected  for all  other
categories  of risk such as those associated with acute sickness and mild sickness.3
Fafchamps  and  Lund  (1997)  also  find  that  poor  households,  whose  capacity  to
reciprocate  is limited  by their poor  human  capital  endowments,  may  not  receive  as  much
support  as they may  need.  This  corroborates  the  finding  of Cox  and  Jimenez  (1995)  that
higher  transfers  accrue  to  households  whose  members  have  a  higher  education  and
correspondingly  higher expected incomes in the long-term.  Other studies have shown that the
ability of the poor to maintain their consumption  in the face of crisis-induced income shocks
is more  limited  compared  to the  non-poor.  For  example, the World Bank  (2000)  finds that
during the last economic crisis, the reduction in consumption of the poor was relatively larger
than that of the non-poor (in technical terms, the mean consumption-to-income  shock ratio of
income-poor and non-poor  was 94 and  78 percent respectively).  This difference  may partly
also  reflect  the  reduced  ability  of rural  households  to  insure  against  risk,  because  private
income transfers suffered by the covariance of shock created by El Niflo drought.
In the  above-mentioned  study,  Cox  and  Jimenez  (1995)  also  simulate  the  effects of
the  introduction  of  unemployment  insurance  in  the  Philippines,  assuming  a  50  percent
replacement  rate.  Their simulations  show that the reduction of private transfers  would erode
91 percent of the income received from the public program, yielding very little net gain.
Implications  for program choice and design.  The above  findings  have  diverse  and
far-reaching  consequences.  First,  regional  unevenness  of the  size of transfers suggests  that
some  regions  are  more  in  need  of  supplementary  public  programs  such  as  labor-based
infrastructure  projects than others.  Second, because of large transfers  from abroad,  private
transfers  are less susceptible to domestic macro shocks - but transfers  from domestic  sources
are  vulnerable  to  covariant  risks.  Third,  although they  are  sizeable,  private transfers  offer
only  limited  insurance  against  income  shocks,  particularly  to  the poor.  And  fourth,  simple
analyses that do not account for private transfer responses to the expansion  or introduction of
public  income  support  programs  exaggerate  the  effectiveness  of public programs. Evidence
3  To  improve  health  insurance,  the  information  gathered  by  barangay health  workers  should  be  used  for
selecting,  enrolling  and  subsidizing  the premiums  of vulnerable  individuals and  families  to  the  government's
National  Health Insurance Program.
13suggests that these responses would consist of sharp cutbacks in private transfers, particularly
for programs where the likely main beneficiaries are the non-poor,  whose transfers are more
responsive to income shocks.
3.4  The ability of individuals to self-protect 4
Formal  and informal strategies  for self-protection are available only for high-income
workers, but are inadequate for most sectors of the rural poor.  Recent household income and
expenditure  surveys  show  that despite informal  modes of insurance,  the poor absorb a great
portion  of income  shock  through  reduced  consumption.  Compared  to  richer households,  a
greater number of the poor reduced the household's food intake, took children out of school,
and increased working hours to the possible detriment of childcare  by homemakers  (see table
3.4). Local shocks (for example,  pestilence) frequently result in the exhaustion of savings set
aside for consumption smoothing, and - if they are covariant - in the reduction of the ability
of households to provide support to others.
Table 3.4 Household Responses  during the Asian Financial Crisis
Income  Total HHs  Percent of RH  Responding to Crisis by
Decile  Responding  Changing  Taking  Migrating  Receiving  Receiving  Increasing
(1997  Eating  Children  to city or  assistance  assistance  working
FIES)  Pattern  Out of  other  from  from gov't  hours
School  countries  friends/
relatives
Poorest  2,256  56.7  12.4  7.8  16.5  10.7  37.5
2  2,223  52.3  9.3  5.4  17.1  8.8  36.8
3  2,211  50.7  7.3  5.4  16.3  8.4  33.6
4  2,206  51.0  8.7  5.2  17.0  6.8  33.1
5  2,180  47.8  7.1  4.5  17.2  5.9  29.4
6  2,155  48.3  5.6  3.8  16.4  5.7  27.0
7  2,138  47.0  5.0  3.7  15.0  4.5  26.1
8  2,125  44.1  3.5  3.4  12.5  2.9  22.3
9  2,097  41.4  3.2  3.1  13.8  3.9  23.1
Richest  2,011  33.3  1.2  3.5  12.0  2.6  18.2
Total  21,602  47.5  6.4  4.6  15.4  6.1  28.9
Source:  Panel data constructed  from the 1997 Family  Income andfExpenditures  Survey and the 1998 Annual PovertyIndicator
Survey.
Companies  among  the  top  5,000  corporations  frequently  have  private  retirement,
education,  accident  insurance,  and/or life  plans  for their workers.  These  policies  have  cash
surrender  values  and  it is  also  routine  for insurance  firms  to  offer  policy  loans  using the
4 Self-protection refers to individual  strategies for both (i)  smoothing consumption in the face of income shocks,
and (ii) reducing the probability of prolonged unemployment  and underemployment.
14premium as collateral.  Of the 419 collective bargaining  agreements that were forged in 1997,
128  or 30  percent  contained  provisions  for life  insurance  of workers.  Assuming  that the
same  proportion applies  also to workers, then only around  157 thousand  of workers (of 525
thousand  workers  covered  by  the  agreements,  and  of the  total  of  9.6  million  workers
employed  in private  establishments),  had  life insurance  policies in  1997.  The records  of the
Insurance  Commission  show  that  by  1998  more  than  five  billion  pesos  of  the  total
accumulated  assets  of  the  life  insurance  industry  was  in  the  form  of  policy  loans  by
individual policyholders. Non-life insurance plans are more common.
Workers in the formal sector have access  to consumer  credit,  although this access  is
highly  uneven.  Typically,  workers  with  incomes  above  the  eighth  decile  (with  minimum
annual incomes in the vicinity of P156,000) have some access to cash advances and credit of
up to P25,000 at the least from credit card companies. In Metro Manila, for instance, close to
39 percent of households  had  income levels between P121,000 and P246,000, income  levels
which span the eighth and ninth income deciles (1997 FIES). This figure is similarly high for
the two other regions in the vicinity of Metro  Manila - Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog
- at  31  and 24 percent,  respectively.  However,  outside of these regions, those  workers who
may  be  eligible  to  consumer  credit  mostly  account  for  below  10  to  15  percent.  These
magnitudes  are also indicative  of the relative  adequacy of savings  that poor households  are
capable of making.
For poorer workers in the urban areas, pawnshops are a means to generate cash on the
basis of assets they may have accumulated.  In  1993 there were 3,032 pawnshops  (an average
of two for every municipality) in the Philippines with assets of P5.2 billion.  Pawnshops offer
low  transaction  costs,  rapid  loan  processing  (15  minutes)  and  average  loan  amounts  of
P1,000 at interest rates between 4 and 5 percent per month.
Among  poorer  workers  in  rural  areas,  self-protection  takes  less  institutionalized
modes than those described above.  It is usually assumed that temporary jobs in the informal
sector  or in non-farm  rural  activities  serve  as  easy  modes  of coping.  Labor productivity  in
these activities,  however,  is  very  low  except  in areas  very  close  to  Metro  Manila  and the
other urban  centers.  Labor  productivity  in  the  informal  sectors  in  Ilocos  region,  Cagayan
Valley, Bicol region, Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao, ARMM and Central  Mindanao  is
not  even  half of the  official  poverty  threshold  of 70,000  pesos  (1998  Yearbook  of Labor
15Statistics,  table 9.3). Three members of the household will have  to be working full time for
income in the informal sector to lift households above the poverty line.
According  to  the  Agricultural  Credit  Policy  Council,  in  1997  the  majority  of the
country's 4.6 million small farmers were not able to obtain agricultural loans from banks and
other  lending institutions.  Only about  1.84  million small  farmers  (about  40  percent  of the
total population)  were able to  secure loans  from these formal  conduits of credit.  Financial
institutions,  including  government  ones,  are  notoriously  reluctant  to  lend  to  the  poor  for
consumption purposes. The poor must then turn to each other for support when hit by shocks.
The preponderance  of inter-household  transfers and zero-interest  reciprocal  loans are of this
nature (see above).
Even without  formal  insurance  markets  in the  rural  areas,  there  are  modes  of self-
protection  available to  small farmers.  One  important  mechanism  is share-tenancy.  Tenants
can borrow from their landlords using their share in farm produce as collateral. Beyond being
a  credit  channel,  and  in  contrast  to  the  leasing  or  direct  ownership  of  land  by  small
independent  farmers,  this  arrangement  reduces  the  magnitude  of the  income  loss  to  the
farming  household if there is crop failure.  It is akin to the limited liability of shareholders  of
corporations.  Due to their lower ability to absorb  income  shocks, this option  is preferred by
poorer farmers.  Another mechanism  of informal insurance  used by small farmers  is keeping
farm  animals  or  excess  grain  supplies.  According  to  Binswanger  and Rozensweig  (1992),
"investment  portfolios of small farmers reflect their difficulties  in smoothing consumption in
the face of high risks."
The household as the locus of  coping. The household, rather than just the individual,.
is the locus of distress and response to underemployment  and  unemployment.  For example,
during  the  recent  crisis,  industries  with  predominantly  male  employment  (agriculture,
manufacturing,  and  construction)  were more  adversely  affected  (Table 3.5),  and as a result,
male unemployment  deteriorated  much more considerably than female  unemployment.  This
triggered  the  entry into the  labor market  by secondary  income  earners  - particularly  urban
women below the age of 54 and young urban males (Table  3.6). It is noteworthy that the rise
in labor force participation  by young  women  and men during the crisis coincided with data
showing  significant  declines  in  high school  enrollment  rates.  While  school  enrollment  was
growing  by  more  than  2  percent  during  the  good  years,  the  school  year  1998-99  saw  a
16decline  in the  number of high school enrollees  by as much as  7.68  percent  for females  and
6.63 percent for males.
Table 3.5  Structure of Employment  by Major Industry Group and Sex
(October figures,  in percent)
1987  1989  199  1 1993  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
A. WOMEN
Agriculture, Fishery  and Forestry  32.7  30.9  30.1  32.7  31.1  30.3  28.4  27.3  26.9
Mining and Quarrying  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
Manufacturing  12.6  13.6  13.3  12.6  12.7  12.0  12.1  11.4  12.0
Elec., Gas and Water  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Construction  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2
Wholesale and Retail Trade  24.7  25.2  25.7  25.1  26.0  26.1  26.1  26.6  26.7
Transportation Storage and Communication  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.0
Financing. Insurance Real estate and Business  1.9  1.9  2.0  2.2  2.3  2.6  2.7  2.7  2.8
Services
Community, Social  and Personal  Services  27.0  27.1  27.7  26.2  26.6  27.8  29.3  30.5  30.1
B. MEN
Agriculture, Fisheryand  Forestry  56.4  53.2  54.0  53.5  51.7  48.5  47.6  47.5  46.7
MiningandQuanrying  1  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5
Manufacturing  8.4  8.8  8.8  8.5  8.4  8.9  8.5  8.4  8.1
Elec.,  Gas and Water  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7
Constniction  5.6  6.4  7.0  7.0  7.5  9.0  9.2  8.4  8.3
Wholesale  and Retail Trade  7.5  7.7  7.0  7.6  7.9  8.2  8.6  8.6  9.3
Transportation  Storage and Communication  6.8  7.5  7.5  8.4  8.8  9.1  9.6  10.1  10.6
Financing,  Insurance Real estate and Business  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.3
ServicesI
Community, Social and  Personal Services  12.0  13.1  12.3  11.8  12.5  12.7  12.8  13.6  13.7
Source: Labor Force Surveys, National Statistics  Office
Table 3.6: Labor force participation rate by age group
Urban and rural, by sex and age  group
FEMALE  MALE
URBAN  1996  1997  1998  1999  1996  1997  1998  1999
All ages  48.62  49.24  50.07  50.58  78.46  78.22  78.77  77.90
15-19  27.47  26.67  27.95  26.80  33.92  33.56  35.83  33.89
20-24  53.99  54.04  56.31  57.32  77.76  77.26  77.81  76.92
25-34  55.04  56.00  56.79  59.22  96.51  96.22  96.48  96.15
35-44  58.44  61.57  61.82  60.99  98.54  98.06  98.48  97.37
45-54  59.25  60.12  60.70  61.25  95.05  95.82  95.20  95.23
55-64  48.89  49.16  49.10  49.67  80.61  80.17  80.73  81.02
65  over  22.25  23.92  24.72  24.77  42.88  43.44  42.47  39.64
RURAL  1996  1997  1998  1999  1996  1997  1998  1999
All ages  49.31  48.61  48.49  49.30  86.44  86.08  86.56  85.22
15-19  29.91  26.51  26.65  24.72  57.61  55.12  56.92  54.08
20-24  45.64  43.25  44.78  46.89  87.29  86.97  86.53  85.11
25-34  50.06  49.86  49.78  48.68  97.84  97.70  97.88  97.20
35-44  58.36  60.59  58.80  59.98  99.06  99.29  99.27  98.97
45-54  65.20  63.09  63.33  66.45  98.31  98.19  98.65  98.13
55-64  58.75  58.96  58.74  60.91  92.47  93.10  94.23  93.61
65  over  34.91  34.28  33.85  34.37  67.14  67.88  69.55  65.63
All ages  49.0  48.90  49.30  50.0  82.70  82.40  82.90  81.80
Source: Various Labor Force Surveys, National  Statistics Office
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imperfections  leave  farmers  - particularly  poor  ones  - vulnerable  to  income  shocks.
Covariance  of  risk  and  moral  hazard  problems  make  the  establishment  of  credit  and
insurance  programs  particularly  difficult  in  rural  areas,  and  the  poor experience  of such
schemes is testimony to this difficulty (Hazell  et al,  1986).
To improve  farmers' ability to smooth consumption,  other means of consumption smoothing
are  required  in  addition  to  savings  programs  (such  as  replications  of the  Grameen  Bank
experience)  and  various  publicly  supported  livelihood  programs.  Public  employment
schemes are an obvious alternative, particularly in remote areas where private modes of self-
protection are the most restricted due to the low productivity of non-farm employment.
Because  mobilizing  secondary  income earners  of a  household  entails  taking  youths
out of school and reducing  childcare,  it imposes large social costs.  To reduce incentives of
the  recourse  to  such  negative  coping  mechanisms,  income  support  programs  could  be
narrowly targeted to families with members  who were laid off from work and have children
who may be at risk of being kept out of school due to greater care-giving  or income-earning
assignments. The support can be targeted not necessarily just to the individuals  who become
unemployed  but also towards the vulnerable  family members of the unemployed  in the form
of schooling subsidies, for example.
3.5  The nature of shocks
Apart  from  the  idiosyncratic  risk  of unemployment  resulting  from  the  ongoing,
regular  process  of labor reallocation  in  the economy  (when an  individual's  probability  to
become  unemployed  is unrelated  to  the probability  of others),  in the  Philippines  there  are
also other significant sources of unemployment shocks.
Geography and climate. In the past decade,  geography  and climate have increasingly
caused significant  employment and income insecurity.  The decline in agricultural production
and employment  creation  that coincided  with  the  Asian  financial  crisis  was  caused  by the
drought brought  by the El  Nifio phenomenon.  El  Nifio  is widely expected to  be  a periodic
occurrence,  exposing  large  segments  of  the  rural  population  to  income  insecurity.  For
example,  among  those  rendered  thoroughly  defenseless  by the  recent  El Nifio  drought  are
small  farmers in the mono-crop areas of the coconut sector (note that coconut is grown on 3
million hectares  or  one-fourth  of farmland  in the  Philippines).  Otherwise  healthy  coconut
18trees have  been  known to  become  unproductive  for  up io  three years.  Another  significant
source of  job and income  insecurity is the high frequency  of typhoons,  which is a staple  for a
country that is in the monsoon belt.
Macroeconomic volatility.  From  the  Philippines'  perspective,  there  was  nothing
extraordinary  about the Asian financial  crisis. Unlike the East and Southeast Asian countries
that experienced  decades of growth prior to 1997, episodes of economic volatility resulting in
recessions have visited the Philippines  with a frequency  more akin to the experience of Latin
American  countries.  An  economic  crisis  similar  in  depth  and  consequence  to  the  crisis  in
Indonesia today took place from  1985 to 1986. A recession  also happened  from 1991 to  1992
whose  effect on  workers  was of similar magnitude  to the most recent economic  slowdown.
These  cycles  of economic  ups  and  downs  coincide  with  the  levels  of foreign  exchange
available for the purchase of raw material, machinery,  and intermediate goods.
It is also believed that in the past decade,  economic uncertainty has increased  with the
liberalization  of the trade in commodities,  particularly with the accession of the  Philippines
to the terms and conditions  of the Uruguay round of the GATT. 5 The reduction of protection
of industry and, to a lesser extent, of agriculture  has generated  anticipations of retrenchment
in segments  of industries  with low productivity.6 International  competition  arising from this
new  arrangement  dictates  greater  labor  flexibility,  weakening  the  traditional  permanent
relationship with employees.
A  further  source  of macroeconomic  instability  is  capital  account  liberalization  and
exchange  rate  misalignment.  After  the  deregulation  of the  capital  account  in  1992,  the
appreciation  of the  exchange  rate  created  problems  for  exporters  and  import-competing
industries  (for instance,  see de Dios et al,  1997).  In contrast,  the Asian financial  crisis and
recent political  crisis resulted  in an under-valuation  of the peso. And  as evidenced  in recent
decades, political uncertainty is also a major factor of macro-destabilization.
5  The first phase of the tariff reform program was implemented  from  1981  to 1985; it brought tariffs down from
ranges of 100 percent to within 50 percent.  The import liberalization  program of 1986 to 1988 sought to reduce
the number  of import-restricted  items.  From  1991  to  1995  most tariff levels  were  narrowed  down to mostly
within the  30  percent  range.  Finally  the  ongoing  tariff reform  program,  which  commenced  in  1996,  aims  at
further reducing tariffs down to the range of between three to ten percent by the end of the year 2000 (excluding
some agricultural  products like sugar, rice and corn).
6 Beginning  in the mid-90s major new programs of the Department of Labor and Employment were directed  at
workers who, it was expected,  were going to be affected by the GATT.
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individuals,  households  or  communities  cannot  take  effective  protective  measures.  Public
systems  - through  the  ability to  pool  resources  across  larger groups  - are  called  for.  The
existence of natural calamities  speaks in favor of a flexible program of public works.
3.6  The maturity of the financial market
Presently,  the  mitigation of risk through the financial  market  in areas  like  financial
asset  accumulation,  access  to  credit  for  production  and  consumption  purposes,  and  crop
insurance,  is very limited. For example, 40 percent of the 629,000 families living in poverty
and engaged  in entrepreneurial  activities could not avail themselves of credit (according  to
1992 data of the National Statistics Coordination  Board).  Moreover,  because  rural financial
markets are segmented and highly incomplete, farmers resort to costly informal substitutes of
precautionary  saving such as  storing assets  by  accumulation  of farm  animals,  and distress
sales of productive assets.
The public  sector has  a facilitating  role for improving the access of informal workers
to  financial  markets.  For  example,  the  Department  of Social  Welfare  and  Development,
through  its  program  Self-Employment  Assistance,  does  not  only  provide  incentive  for
increased spread of group savings  institutions, it also helps groups and individuals "graduate"
from  being  primarily  beneficiaries  of  grants  into  entities  capable  of tapping  the  formal
financial  system.  Government  financial  institutions,  such  as  the  Philippine  Credit  and
Finance  Corporation and the Land Bank, also encourage the formation of credit cooperatives
and  groups.  However,  there  should  be  more  scope  for  the  private  sector,  market-based
provision of insurance,  especially as the formal sector grows.
Implications for program choice and design.  As  the  country's  financial  system
deepens and becomes more spatially integrated, the recourse to market-based  risk mitigation
mechanisms  will  gradually increase, which may go hand-in-hand  with a reduction of the use
of  informal  risk  management  mechanisms  (such  as  private  transfers).  An  important
inducement to such development  may be the promotion of provident  funds  created by firms
for their employees,  the possibility already  being  offered  by private  banking  and  insurance
companies.
203.7  Public forced savings mechanisms
Employees  in  the private  sector  are  covered  under three  mandatory  social  security
systems (SSS,  EC, and Pag-IBIG).  The characteristic  of the Philippine  system  is that these
institutions have a loan function (see box 3.1).
Box 3.1:  Loans based  on savings funds existing in the Philippines
(a) Policy  loans  from private life  and  non-life  insurance companies.  As part of benefit packages
negotiated  in  collective  bargaining  agreements,  it  is  increasingly  becoming  common  for  firns  to
purchase  for their employees  pre-need  financial  products  from commercial  banks  and pre-need  firms.
Thirty  percent  of collective  bargaining  agreements  forged  in  1997  contained  provisions  for  the  life
insurance of workers and  68 percent contained  provisions  for retirement  provident funds.  Employers
may  opt  to  purchase  these  pre-need  plans  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of the  retirement  law
(Republic  Act  7641).  Workers  are  able  to  borrow  from  these  individual  pre-need  and  retirement
accounts  after the balance exceeds  a certain threshold.
(b)  Multi-Purpose  Loan Program (Home  Development  Mutual Fund - Pag-IBIG).  The Pag-IBIG
Fund  is  a mandatory contributory  fund mainly used  for housing finance  purposes  (see text).  Under its
multi-purpose  loan program,  a member  may avail of a subsidized  loan  equivalent to 60 percent of his
total savings to be used for housing and other needs (medical,  educational,  etc.).  To qualify,  a member
must have made at least 24 monthly  contributions  and is an  active  member upon loan application.  The
loan is payable over a  period of 24 months and  bears an interest rate of 10.75  percent per annum. On
the  12'h  month of repayment, 50 percent of the loan may be rolled over.
After the twentieth  year of membership  (beginning  at age  45)  and  under  contingencies  that  include
separation  from  work due  to  health  reasons  and  early retirement,  a member  may  withdraw  the total
accumulated  value  in  his  individual  account.  This  amount  includes  the  employee's  share,  employer
share and dividend earnings.
(c)  Emergency  Loan Program for Displaced  Workers.  From mid  1998 to 2000, 46,000 unemployed
SSS members  were allowed to take out a maximum loan  amount of P12,500 chargeable  on their future
benefits  if not paid within two years.  Except for the subsidy on the interest  rates (pegged  at 6 percent),
SSS  members  who  otherwise were not  likely to  have access to consumption  credit were  able to draw
down on their own savings or were borrowing  from their future  contributions.  A similar program exists
for sugar workers (P100 million Emergency Loan Program for Workers in the Sugar Industry).
The Social Security System  was (SSS) introduced  in  1957, and the system originally
covered  employers with more than 50 employees.  Later the potential coverage of SSS was
expanded to all employees,  self-employed,  and informal sector workers earning at least  1,000
pesos,  such  as  ambulant  vendors  and  watch-your-car  boys.  SSS  currently  has  about  21
million registered members,  but the number of contribution-paying  members is only about  6
million.  SSS  covers  sickness,  retirement,  maternity,  disability,  and death  and funeral.  The
participants can also get loans from  SSS,  for short-term  financial needs,  for financing  small
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program.  The  contribution  rate  is  5.07  percent  for  employers  and  3.33  percent  for
employees.
Employees' Compensation Program (EC)  is a compensation  package for public  and
private  sector employees,  introduced  in  1975.  The Employees  Compensation  Commission,
which is in charge of the program, is an agency attached to the Department of Labor.  The EC
program  aims  to  assist  workers  who  suffer  work-related  sickness  or  injury  resulting  in
disability  or  death.  The  contribution  rate  is  1%  for employers,  through  the  State Insurance
Fund.  The  benefits  under  the  EC  program  may  be  enjoyed  simultaneously  with  benefits
under the SSS program.  All  SSS-registered employers  and their employees  are compulsorily
covered under the program (others are excluded).
During  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  the  EC  was  mainly  a  source  of finance  for the
emergency loan that was administered by the SSS. In 2000 the EC had more than PlO billion
in  accumulated  contributions  from  employers  (see  box  3.1  and  table  3.7  in  which  we
summarize  some social  safety  net  programs  in  recent  years,  including  the emergency  loan
program for displaced workers).  This emergency  loan program for displaced workers was an
effort by the government to provide a replacement for benefits  that cease to be accessible  to
members who  become unemployed.  For example,  while the total salary loans  given to  SSS
members in 1997 was P5.8 billion in 1997, this amount went down to P4.9 billion by 1998, at
the peak of the crisis. The total salary loans given  out prior to the crisis in 1996 amounted to
more than six billion pesos.
Pag-IBIG. The  Pag-IBIG  Fund  is  a  mandatory  contributory  fund  mainly  used  for
housing  finance purposes.  Coverage  is mandatory  for all  SSS members eaming  P4,000 and
above monthly.  Membership  to the fund is also open to employees  earning  less than P4,000
and  self-employed.  As of year-end  1998,  fund membership  level stood  at 4.6 million.  The
contribution  is  1 percent  for employees with monthly compensation  less than P1,500,  and 2
percent  for  those  with  monthly  pay  over P1,500.  Employers  are  mandated  to  match  their
employees'  monthly contributions  with an amount equivalent to two percent  of the monthly
compensation  of each covered  employee.  Dividends from the Pag-IBIG saving are tax-free,
and  a member  can carry  his saving from  one  company  to another.  Withdrawal  from  Pag-
IBIG  is allowed at the membership  maturity after 20 years and retirement  from labor market
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total  accumulated  value  of their account  for medical,  educational,  livelihood,  minor home
improvement  and other related needs, with interest rate of 10.75  percent.  Members  can also
borrow from Pag-IBIG up to P500,000 for housing.
Implications for program choice  and design.  The  existence  of  various  saving
mechanisms  suggests that  precautionary  saving  has  deep  roots  in  the  Philippines  society.
Moreover,  it is interesting to  note that such  saving mechanisms  have  been used to provide
collateral  for consumer  and other types of loans- that  is, that programs with similar features
as individual savings  accounts have  emerged by themselves,  and that in case of emergency
loans  for  displaced  workers,  such  programs  have  also  covered  the  unemployment  risk.
Therefore, it seems that a natural way to strengthen existing mechanism dealing  with income
shocks  is to  encourage  individual  savings  accounts  and  extending the  scope of their  use -
basically to cover, on top of existing contingencies, also the risk of unemployment.
3.8  Administrative capacity for beneficiary screening
One  important  consideration  when  choosing  an  income  support  program  is  the
availability of administrative  capacity necessary for its implementation.  Below we focus on
the  capacity  to  evaluate  initial  eligibility  for  program  benefits,  as  well  as  to  monitor  the
fulfillment of requirements for continuation of the benefits.  Administrative  capacity involves
the capacity to generate and process information on (i)  the payment of program contributions
by  or on the behalf of the worker,  as well as (ii)  the employment/unemployment  status, job
search  effort,  and  incomes  from  other  sources  and  assets  of the  worker,  and  (iii)  his/her
family circumstances - number of family members, as well as their incomes and assets.
The  experience  with  forced  saving  mechanisms  described  above  suggests  that
information  requirements  about  the  payment  of  program  premiums  do  not  constitute  a
significant  barrier for the introduction  of unemployment  programs of contributory  nature  in
the Philippines.  For example,  the  SSS administration  keeps  records  of contributions  of its
active members  so as to be able to calculate  the pension benefits - and precisely this kind of
information  system  would  be  necessary  for  the  administration  of  programs  such  as
unemployment  insurance/assistance  and  unemployment  insurance  saving  accounts  (UISA).
Moreover,  recent  advancements  of information  and communication  technology  suggest that
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increasingly more affordable even in low-income countries such as the Philippines.
While  information  technology  is  instrumental  in  maintaining  the  records  about
payment of premiums,  it is only of limited help when it comes to determining  labor market
status and job search efforts as required by unemployment  insurance/assistance  programs.  In
fact,  several  factors  make  monitoring of labor market  status  and job search  efforts  quite  a
challenging  task also  for more  developed countries.  First, what is the best way to  monitor
"availability  for  work"  - the  requirement  often  used  to  curtail  informal  employment?
Different  countries  use  different  approaches,  but they  all have  shortcomings.  For  example,
recent  amendments  in  the  unemployment  benefit  law  of  Slovenia  require  that  benefit
recipients make themselves available  for contacts by employment offices  for three hours per
day,  but  preliminary  results  show  little  effect  on  disqualification.  Moreover,  such  an
arrangement  may  well  backfire  because  it  forces  employment  counselors  to  assume  two
opposing  roles:  one  of job  facilitator,  and  the  other  of  a  policeman.  On  the  one  hand,
counselors try to help the unemployed  by preparing  a job plan, directing them to training etc.
On the other hand, they are forced to "spy"  on the availability of the unemployed to find out
whether they  are  in fact available  to take a job - and,  if deemed necessary,  disqualify  them
from  getting  the  benefits.  Second,  similar difficulties  are  related  to  the monitoring  of the
requirement  of "actively  seeking  employment."  Because  this  requirement  entails  many
different  aspects,  it  cannot  easily  be  incorporated  in  legislation.  What  can  normally  be
reasonable  to  expect  from  the  unemployed  may  well  depend  on  individual  circumstances
(such as skills, qualifications,  experience,  and also the length of the unemployment spell), as
well  as  on  available  vacancies  in the  local  labor  market.  Third,  additional  problems  are
involved  in defining  a  "suitable  job,"  and  with  limiting  the  amount  of work  that  may be
undertaken without being disqualified for the benefit.
For several reasons,  the task of monitoring  labor market  status is even more  difficult
for a low-income  country like the Philippines.  Above all, monitoring of availability to work,
and  earnings  obtained  in  engagement  in  informal  sector,  is  virtually  impossible.  As
discussed  above,  a  very  large  informal  sector,  together  with  the  ease  to  enter  and  exit
informal sector activities,  imposes large costs on verification procedures to identify the status
of unemployment,  as well as earnings of individuals.  At the same time, the income forgone
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the difference  in productivity between the formal and informal  sector is much smaller  in the
Philippines  than  in developed  countries.  The  task of monitoring  eligibility  could become
somewhat  easier  when  a  link  between  the  Social  Security  System  (SSS)  and  Public
Employment  Service  Offices (PESOs)  is established  (currently, however,  such link does not
exist yet,  as the capacity  of PESOs in terms of information technology is still very limited).
Another matter is also whether the rules, even  in the absence  of information  problems,  are
strictly enforced  due to political  considerations.  In the near future, the computerized records
of monthly  pension  fund  payments  by  the  three  million  paying  members  at  the  Social
Security  System  has  the  potential  of being  transformed  into  a  tool  for  determining  the
employment  status  of these  (mostly  formal  sector)  workers.  But  there  is  no  similar
institutional  starting point for  determining  the employment  status of around  7 million other
wageworkers  who  are not covered  by either the private  sector  or the public  sector pension
scheme.
Even  higher  administrative  costs  can  be  expected  under  a  formal  means-testing
program  such as  unemployment  assistance  - a program  which,  in addition  to checking  the
labor  market  status,  requires  also  the  information  about  the  income  and  assets  of the
applicants and their families. In part, this is because income tax returns in the Philippines  are
not  reliable  indicators  of income,  except possibly  for the  subset of wage  workers  who  are
regular  paying  members  of the  pension  funds.7 In  the  absence  of reliable  administrative
databases  and  self-selection  mechanisms,  public  employment  service  offices  must  put
significant resources  in means-testing  function - otherwise,  leakages  of program benefits  to
the  non-poor  workers  could  be  very  large.  For  example,  despite  significant  costs  the
University of the Philippines  regularly  verifies the information required by its means-testing
scheme  for determining  students'  eligibility for tuition  fee  subsidies  and  allowances  - and
often  finds  cases  of under-declaration,  despite  the  fact  that  the  existence  of monitoring
undoubtedly contributes to the deterrence  of such behavior (see box 3.2).
7Because employer contributions to the pension funds are -- up to a point -- a rising function of the declared
income of the worker,  this creates some incentives  against a systematic under-declaration of income from wages.
There  are, however,  many other sources of income outside of wages that cannot be similarly tracked.
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In  1989,  the  University  of the  Philippines  introduced  The  Socialized  Tuition  Fee  Assistance
Program (STFAP) to target financial assistance to students  from poor families.  The assistance  is
graduated:  those  placed  in  the  lowest  income  category  receive  monthly  stipends  in addition  to
tuition waiver; those placed in top income category - and those who do not file applications - are
charged a full tuition fee, and those in the middle receive a graduated tuition waiver.
Because  in the Philippines income tax returns are not considered  reliable, applicants  are required
to provide  information  and  documentary  support  on  a range  of questions.  For  example,  the
applicant must provide  verifiable  information  on  employment  and sources of income  of parents
and  siblings,  as  well  as  close  relatives  who  may  be in  a position  to  provide  assistance  to the
student.  Detailed  information  on  a  range  of  assets  the  family  owns  must  also  be  reported
(including,  for  example,  the  vintage  of the  family  car),  as  well  details  on  consumption  (the
utilities bill and travel expenditures).
The  STFAP  staff of sixteen  people  must screen  an average  of 5,000  applications  per year. The
process  involves  receiving  applications,  verifying  the  supporting  documents  for  correctness,
checking  if all  pertinent  information  was  supplied,  contacting  the  applicants  to  correct  and
complete  deficient  applications,  and  encoding  school  records.  In  the  year  2000,  the  STFAP
program  had a budget of P3.2 million for the salaries  and administration  costs; this  amounts  to
administrative  costs of P640 per applicant (or $13).
In  three  months  of the  year  when  applications  are  not  being  processed,  random  surveillance
checks  or "home visits"  are  conducted  all over  the country  (in  1999,  there were  500  of them).
Visits  of students who  appeal  their income  bracket  classification  are  also regularly  conducted.
The budget for surveillance  activity has been growing over the decade  since the program  started.
Ten percent (fifty cases) of these visits revealed various degrees of under-declaration.  The penalty
for providing misleading infornation can result in the loss of eligibility for benefits and expulsion
from  the university,  and  may  include  a demand  for the  reimbursement of past  benefits.  There
have been several well-publicized  cases of suspension.
Source: An interview with Ms. Bella Villanueva,  director of the UP Diliman STFAP Office.
None of the PESOs around the  country come  close to developing the administrative
capacity  necessary for checking the labor force status and job-search efforts, and for means-
testing.  A  survey  of 61  PESOs  (Ofreneo  2001)  in  Central  Luzon  (a  relatively  developed
region right outside of Metro Manila) reveals that in the year 2000,  82 percent of PESOs had
only one employed worker who had other tasks aside from implementing the PESO programs.
Except in a handful of highly urbanized  locations  like Angeles City, Pasig City and Bulacan,
most PESOs around the country are active only during summer months of April and May and
during the Christmas  season when the screening of participants  in the wage  subsidy program
(the  Special  Program  for the  Employment  of Students  - SPES)  takes  place.  For  example,
during  the Asian  financial  crisis, PESOs  carried out a modicum  of beneficiary  screening of
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displaced  workers.  But  the  screening  was  incomplete:  because  the  PESOs  had  no
information  on reemployment  of workers,  they could  not exclude  from the programs  those
workers  who may  have  already  found  a job  by the  time they  applied  to participate  in the
labor department programs.  Most of the PESOs are also under the direct supervision of local
chief executives  and  this has  sometimes  meant that politicians  sought  accommodations  in
PESO programs that benefit their political  supporters.8
Administrative  capacity for implementing  labor-based public  works schemes  seem to
be  in  a  better  shape,  as  such  tasks  have  become  routine  for  local  governments  in  the
Philippines.  There  are  also  around  seven  hundred  engineers  mainly  at  offices  of the
Department of Public  Works and Highways  all over the country who have received  training
on this construction technology.  What needs to be further improved, however,  is the capacity
of local  governments  to  bid  out,  program  the  timely  release  of  financing,  and  monitor
contract compliance for small public works projects.
Implications  for program choice and design.  The above  discussion makes clear that
in a low-income country like the Philippines, monitoring of income support programs is more
demanding and  costly than in developed  countries - and  the existing  capacity much poorer.
There  are two reasons that make effective monitoring of unemployment  insurance/assistance
eligibility  conditions  more  costly.  First,  given  abundant  employment  opportunities  in the
informal  market,  monitoring  of  labor  market  status  of  (potential)  beneficiaries  requires
relatively  more  resources  for  the  detection  of  labor  market  status  of  (prospective)
beneficiaries  and  their  labor  market  opportunities.  Second,  the  ability  to  use  various
administrative  databases  for determining labor market  status and for cross-checking  is more
limited.  As  for  the  existing  administrative  capacity  of the  Philippines,  the  above  review
makes  it clear that at this point the  PESO system  still lacks  the  administrative  capacity for
determining  the  employment status  of workers as required  by unemployment  insurance  and
unemployment  assistance,  and  to  carry  out  means-testing,  as  required  by  unemployment
8  There  are  anticipations at the labor department  that things  will take a turn  for the  better.  Implementing  rules
for a  new PESO law issued  in 2000  include a plan to provide resources and  permanent  full time personnel  for
PESOs found  in provincial  capitals and key cities and municipalities  around the country.  These PESOs  will be
directly under the supervision of the labor department.
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based public works schemes.
4.  Choosing Among Alternative Income Support Programs
This section  describes  alternative  public income  support programs that  are  available
to the  unemployed  in  developed  as well  as some  developing  and transition  countries,  and
evaluates  how appropriate they are deemed to be for the Philippines.  The evaluation  derives
from the discussion of the preceding two sections,  using the analytical  framework  developed
in section 2, and drawing upon country-specific  conditions discussed in section 3.
The following income support programs will be focused upon:
*  unemployment  insurance,
*  unemployment assistance,
*  severance pay,
*  unemployment insurance  savings accounts,
*  public works, and
*  livelihood programs.
All programs will be discussed in a similar fashion:  we will describe stylized features
of the  program,  analyze  arguments  in  favor  of and  against  the  program,  and  if deemed
appropriate,  elaborate  issues  which  may  arise  in the  implementation  of the program  in the
Philippines. Note that as late as in 1996, a proposal  for the introduction of a very modest UI
program  - the most  common program  of income  support  for the unemployed  in developed
countries  - did  not  gain  approval  either  from  the  employers  or  from  trade  unions  (the
program proposed a flat fee of P1,000,  payable for up to 3  months, to be partly repaid upon
reemployment  - see  the  description  in  UNDP-ILO,  1996).  This  rejection  gives  the
exploration of alternatives to the unemployment insurance programn  even greater importance.
4.1  Unemployment  insurance
Description.  Unemployment  insurance  (UI) is the most common  income replacement
program  for the  unemployed  workers  in developed  countries.  It is typically mandatory  and
covers, with few exceptions,  all workforces  in these countries.  To qualify for UI benefits,  the
worker  must satisfy  the  minimum  covered  employment  or contribution  requirement.  The
cause  of dismissal  may  affect  the  individual's  eligibility  for  benefits,  with quitters  often
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to  take  a  job,  and  that  they  actively  search  for  it.  Non-compliance  can  result  in  the
permanent or temporary  suspension of benefits.  Benefits are usually a proportion of average
earnings  over  some  stipulated  period  of the  most recent  employment  spell.  Generally,  the
initial  replacement  rate  is between 40 and  75  percent of average  earnings.  Wage or benefit
ceilings are used to limit the range of the benefits; benefit floors, typically at minimum wage,
are also sometimes  present.  In addition to the basic  benefit,  dependent supplements  (either
flat-rate  benefits  or  an  extra  percentage  of  average  earnings)  are  sometimes  provided.
Benefits commonly  decline over time and  are limited in duration (in some countries, means-
tested  unemployment  assistance  is  available  after  the  unemployment  insurance  eligibility
expires).  Programs  are  usually  financed  by  contributions  paid  by  employers  and/or
employees.
Arguments in favor of the program. Unemployment insurance is undoubtedly the most
important  income support  program for the unemployed  in developed countries.  It has been
found that it  is quite effective  in fulfilling  its mission - in developed  economies,  it provides
broad coverage  and  adequate  consumption  smoothing.  Moreover,  because it  pools the risk
across large groups of workers,  it is suitable under most types of income shocks.
Arguments  against the program. With  UI  being  the  standard  approach  to  provide
income  support  to  the  unemployed  in  developed  countries,  it  is  important  to  realize  the
danger  of the  "mechanic"  transplantation  of such  a  program  to  a  low-income  developing
country.  Namely,  it has  been  shown that the UI  system  performs  relatively  well  under the
following circumstances:
*  Conducive labor market institutions.
*  Low share of informal economy.
*  Strong administrative  capacity.
*  Absence of persistent structural shocks.
*  Low exposure to political risk.
If one of more  of the above  circumstances  are not fulfilled,  the UI  system does not
perform  all that well,  which means  that it may  create  various  types of inefficiencies,  above
all  by  increasing  equilibrium  unemployment  rate  and  reducing  the  ability  for  flexible
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and for the interactions of shocks with institutions,  Blanchard and Wolfers,  1999).
There  are  several  reasons  for  advocating  a  cautious  approach  when  applying
traditional  unemployment  insurance  program  to  the Philippines.  It is likely  that under the
present weak administrative capacity, its introduction would create misuses of the system and
incentive problems.  By imposing contributions  to be levied on wages, the costs of labor may
also  increase  (depending  on  the  elasticity  of demand  for  labor).  For  both  reasons,  its
introduction could contribute to the growth of the informal  sector as well as to the increase of
equilibrium  level  of  unemployment.  The  latter  effect  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that
unemployment  insurance  would  raise  the  reservation  wage,  thus  increasing  the  bargaining
power  of unions,  which  is  more  likely  to  happen  given  the  fragmented  nature  of wage
bargaining  in  the  Philippines.  Moreover,  by prolonging  unemployment  duration,  it may
contribute to the stickiness  of unemployment and  thus lower adaptability  of the economy  to
shocks - an  extremely important  point in the  Philippines.  Moreover,  as  noted above,  a UI
system  would  largely crowd  out  private  transfers  (Cox  and  Jimenez,  1995),  and  it would
benefit primarily already better-off segments of population.9
4.2  Unemployment  assistance
Description.  Unemployment  assistance  is  a  means-tested,  minimum  income
maintenance program used in some developed countries  (Australia,  New Zealand, and Hong
Kong), as well as in some transition countries.' 0 Benefits,  which are usually in cash, but can
be  in kind as well,  are  granted to working-age  individuals  who are unemployed  and do not
have  the  necessary  financial  resources  to  maintain  a  minimum  standard  of  living  for
themselves  and  their  families.  Cash  benefits  are  typically  flat  rate  at  some  officially
stipulated  level, or equal to the income gap of the applicant family.  Means or income testing
is conducted not only on the personal financial  resources of the applicant but also on that of
his/her spouse and other adult members within the household.  Aside from incomes, the level
of benefits can  vary according  to factors  such as marital  status, the presence  or number of
9 A  recent ILO study also argues against  an immediate  introduction of the Ul system  in the  Philippines,  noting
that currently  there  is no  social  consensus  on  such  an  introduction  and  questioning  the  affordability  of the
scheme  (ILO, 2001).
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Unemployment  assistance  beriefits  are  sometimes  offered  indefinitely,  so  long  as  the
recipient satisfies the eligibility conditions.  Benefit duration is  sometimes limited for recent
graduates  and other groups while  it is extended for claimants  near early or regular retirement
age.
Like unemployment  insurance, unemployment  assistance programs  require applicants
to be  capable and available for work.  Claims are  reviewed at regular intervals to assess job-
seeking intensity and to determine  changes  in household  economic  and  other circumstances
that  may  require  a  change  in  the  benefit  level.  In  some  countries,  eligibility  for
unemployment assistance is not conditional on previous employment or contribution history.
Unemployment  assistance  is financed  by governments through  general tax  revenues,  except
in  countries  with  dual  unemployment  insurance/assistance  schemes,  where  the  source  of
financing  is the same as for unemployment insurance.
Arguments  in  favor  of  unemployment  assistance.  The  main  advantage  of
unemployment  assistance over unemployment  insurance  is the possibility of savings, created
by  denying  or reducing  the  benefits  to those  who  do  not pass the  means test.  For  a low-
income country like the Philippines, this is an extremely  important consideration."
Another important plus for the program  is its highly progressive nature.  For example,
roughly 58 percent of cash benefits in the Australian UA system are paid to those in the three
bottom deciles of the income distribution.  Comparative  data for  13 OECD countries  in  1995
show that the  overall  share of transfers  going to the  bottom three  deciles ranged  from 20.8
percent  in Italy  to Australia's  58.0  percent,  with the  second  highest  percentage  being  53.5
percent  in  France.  Conversely,  the  top  three  deciles  in  Australia  received  7.4  percent  of
transfers,  the lowest percentage  across  the same  13  countries  (all data  from Vroman,  2001).
'° A similar program, offered to all poor individuals - not just the unemployed - is called  social assistance; it is
widely used in developed economies,  but we do not discuss it because it would impose prohibitively large fiscal
costs in a country with such  a low income per capita as the Philippines.
'" There  is  little  empirical  evidence  on  the  size  of savings  generated  by  the  UA  system.  Vodopivec,
Woergoetter  and  Raju  (2001) show that among  European  transition  countries,  Estonia  - a country where  the
unemployment  benefit  system  strongly  resembles  unemployment  assistance  program  - has  by far  the  most
frugal  unemployment  benefit  system.  On  the  other  hand,  based  on  the  analysis  of the  Australian  system,
Vroman (2001)  finds that the costs of the UA system may not be necessarily lower than those of the Ul system.
Vroman's  comparison  of the  costs  of the  two  systems,  however,  ignores  the  fact  that  about  20  percent  of
Australian  UA  recipients  are  regular  wage  earners, the  category  which  is  excluded  from  Ul  benefits  in other
countries.  Moreover,  for countries  with  Ul  system,  a proper comparison  should  combine  the  costs of social
assistance with those of the Ul system.
31Among  transition  economies,  the  distribution  of  unemployment  benefits  was  also  most
progressive  in  Estonia,  the  country  with  an  unemployment  benefit  system  that resembles
unemployment assistance (see table 3.4).
Arguments against unemployment  assistance.  The  above  benefits  of the  program,
however,  have  to  be  balanced  against  serious  shortcomings  of the  program.  The  most
important  shortcoming  is the  heavy  administrative  capacity  required  for  administration  of
unemployment  assistance.  As described  in box 3.2 above,  a similar screening  of applicants
for tuition waiver at the University of the Philippines is carried out at a cost of P640 (around
$13,  as of end of 2000) per applicant  - a cost that seems prohibitively  large for the purpose
at  hand.  To  put this  cost in  perspective,  note  that  per capita  social  sector  spending  in the
Philippines  was  only  P415  in  1998.  12  Similarly,  Subbarao  et  al  (1996)  report  the
administrative  cost  of one  peso  for  every  two  pesos  transferred  to  the  poor  through  the
Department of Social Welfare and Development  program providing cash transfers to the ultra
poor.
The need  for  heavy screening  of the applicants  under the  unemployment  assistance
program  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  program  is  prone  to  moral  hazard  problems:  only
sufficiently  low family earnings trigger the payment of benefits - hence  disincentives to take
a job or to work  longer hours.  For example, empirical  evidence  shows that unemployment
assistance  creates disincentives for family members  of the recipients to take a job: Terrell  et
al  (1996)  report  that the  presence  of an  unemployed  spouse  lowered  the hazard  of exit to
employment of assistance recipients by 72 percent for females and by 82 percent for males in
the  Slovak Republic;  Boeri  (1997) reports similar effects  for Poland.  And especially  for the
unemployed  with  low skills,  the receipt of unemployment  assistance  creates  a "joblessness
trap"  because  of the high  effective  taxation rate upon taking  a job.' 3 The unemployed  thus
have to be monitored  whether they are  available  and willing to take a job, and whether  they
are  actively  searching for a job - the  conditions  especially  difficult to  impose  in a country
like the Philippines (see the discussion above of the country's administrative capacity).
12 This estimate is the sum of per capita spending for the poor in the areas core areas as health, education, water,
nutrition, social welfare and livelihood programs (see table 17, p. 20 in Manasan, July 2000).
13  Vroman  (2001) shows that the Australian  unemployment  assistance  system has  serious problems  with labor
supply incentives created by high effective marginal  tax rates.
32Implementation  hurdles  therefore  suggest  that  unemployment  assistance  program
would  impose large  monitoring  costs,  and  may produce  important leakages.  Together  with
the fact that the unemployed  are not among the least privileged  groups of population (see the
above discussion of the structure of unemployed),  that means that the program would not fare
highly also from the aspect of redistribution.  And, as with unemployment  insurance benefits,
the  existence  of unemployment  cash  benefits  would  largely  crowd  out  private  transfers,
substituting, among others, subtle monitoring mechanisms  that exist among close friends and
relatives with much cruder administrative controls.
4.3  Severance  pay
Description.  A severance  pay is a  lump-sum  payment made  to discharged  workers
either voluntarily by employers (through collective agreements or as part of firm policy) or as
mandated  by governments.  They  are  offered  for both  individual  and collective  dismissals,
usually  with  no  special  dispensations  for  the  latter.  Coverage  is  generally  broad,
encompassing  both  white-  and  blue-collar  workers across  the  entire  spectrum of economic
activity.  However,  in  some  countries,  severance  pay  is  provided  only  in  some  sectors,
industries,  or  firms  above  certain  sizes  (these  practices  are  more  common  in  developing
countries).  Severance  pay  is  typically  provided  to  individuals  who  are  separated
involuntarily, but dismissals  due to misconduct of workers are not covered.  Minimum years
of service requirements  are also sometimes used to limit eligibility.
As  a  rule,  severance  benefits  are  some  function  of the  years  of past  service.  The
standard  formula is one  month's pay  for  each  year of service.  In general,  severance  pay  is
financed  by  employers.  However,  in  some  countries,  the  government  provides  financial
assistance,  particularly  for  large-scale  restructuring  operations  involving  worker
retrenchment en masse.
As described above, in the Philippines, the employment protection legislation requires
a month for notification  and severance  pay equal to at least one month pay for every year of
service  in  case of redundancy,  and  a  half-month  pay for  every  year  of service  in  case of
retrenchment  to  prevent  losses  and  in  cases  of closures.  In  the  event  of bankruptcy  or
liquidation, workers have first preference  as regards their wages and other monetary claims.
Arguments in  favor of severance pay.  In many developing countries,  severance pay is
the  only  formal  income  support  program  available  to  unemployed  workers.  For  workers
33suffering the loss of earnings  due to a job loss, severance pay is undoubtedly a very valuable
benefit  as  it  helps  to  mitigate  the reduction  of consumption.  For  example,  MacIssac  and
Rama (2000)  find that in Peru, per capita consumption  by the unemployed decreases by 10 to
20  percent.  For  those  unemployed  who  received  severance  pay,  however,  the  receipt  of
severance  pay  even  more  than  outweighed  the  effect  of  unemployment,  so  that  the
consumption per head in the initial stages of unemployment was higher than the consumption
per head  of otherwise  similar  workers  who  are  employed.  Moreover,  as  far as efficiency
effects  are concerned,  it has to be emphasized  that because  the amount of severance pay is
not contingent  on the duration of subsequent unemployment,  it does not alter the behavior of
workers  when  searching  for  a  job,  that  is,  it  does  not  create  a  moral  hazard  problem
pertaining to job-search incentives.
Another argument favoring severance  pay schemes is that its administration  does not
require  sophisticated bureaucracy.  Because  the release  of the severance  pay is a transaction
between employers and employees, the role of government is mainly regulatory.
Arguments against severance pay.  As  other  programs  offered  to  formal  sector
workers  only,  severance  pay  beneficiaries  tend  to  be  concentrated  among  the  richest
segments  of population.  In the absence  of information  on severance  pay in the Philippines
household surveys, we rely on data on "back wages"  as proxy for severance  pay.'4 Table 3.4
shows  that richer households  are by far more able  to  enforce their  claims  when employers
violate the procedures  on dismissal to avoid  severance pay; in all likelihood,  then, severance
pay benefits are  also concentrated  among the richest segments  of the population.  Moreover,
workers  in certain  sectors with large seasonal  or temporary  workforces  do not benefit from
severance pay because they never become entitled to it (for example, workers in construction,
and catering  and  tourism).  Furthermore,  because the  severance  pay is "backward  looking"
(that is,  it is based on the  duration of employment  with the  current  employer),  it does  not
provide  income support  in proportion  to the duration of the unemployment  or to the loss of
income.  It therefore does not provide  adequate protection to long-term unemployed.
Even more important are the negative efficiency  effects of severance  pay.  Numerous
studies  have  found that  strict  employment  protection  (of which  severance  pay  is  its  key
4 "Back  wages"  refer  to  income  received  by  workers  who  have  been  reinstated  after  illegal  dismissal  by
employers.  One expects that the experience of illegal dismissals  is more  common among  low income  workers,
because they are less likely to understand their rights, and are also  less likely to be union members.
34element)  reduces  employment. 5  For  example,  the  results  of Lazear  (1990)  show  that  the
increase of severance pay by one month reduces employment per head about 0.4 percent and
reduces  labor force participation  rate by 0.3  percent.  Some new evidence includes (i) OECD
(1999), with the finding that the negative  effects are concentrated  among prime-age  women,
youths,  and  older workers;  (ii)  Haffner  et al  (1999), who  find negative  association  between
the  strictness  of  employment  protection  legislation  and  employment  rates  in  OECD
countries;  and  (iii)  Heckman  and  Pages  (2000),  who  also  confirm  the  link  between  job
security and lower employment and attribute  5 percentage points of reduction of employment
in  Latin  America  to  job  security  provisions.  Moreover,  Lazear  (1990)  also  shows  that
severance  pay contributes  to  turning  full-time jobs into  part-time  ones,  and OECD  (1999)
finds  a  strong  link  between  stricter employment  protection  legislation  and higher  rates  of
self-employment.
Because  the amount of severance  pay - and  even the obligation to pay the benefit  -
depends on the circumstances  of the separation from the company,  determining the cause  for
separation  is contentious.  These  disputes  between  the  employers  and  workers  are  often
brought to the  court and  thus  raise large  litigation  costs - and workers  often  do not  get the
benefits,  or get them with substantial  delay.  For example,  in October 2000  there were  about
45,000  outstanding  lawsuits over the cause  of separation (to put this number in perspective:
according to Bureau  of Labor  and Employment Statistics,  155,000 workers in formal  sector
establishments  were  separated  from  work  in  1998). 16  Many  disagreements  are  about  the
reason  for dismissal  - the compensation  for layoffs to  avoid "further losses"  is  higher than
for  layoffs because  of redundancies.  Court  cases also  drag  on in instances  when firms have
declared  bankruptcy.  Although according  to  law workers  have  priority over the assets  of a
company,  courts  have  had  to  step  in,  in  an  effort,  often  futile,  to  enforce  such  claims.
Workers  who  feel  they  have  been  unjustly  dismissed  by  their  employers  to  avoid  the
separation pay have also resorted to the courts for redress.
15  The predicted effects  of severance  pay on unemployment are ambiguous:  severance pay increases firing costs
and as  such reduces the  probability of an  individual  transiting from employment  to unemployment,  but  at the
same time - through stifling job creation - severance  pay also reduces  the probability of entry to employment.
Consistent  with  theoretical  predictions,  the  effects of employment  protection  legislation  (of which severance
pay is one of the most important  determinants)  on unemployment  are  largely  inconclusive (for a survey of the
effects, see OECD,  1999).  However, several  studies find positive  effects on long-term unemployment.
16  Interview with Mr. Benedicto Emesto Bitonio jr., Undersecretary  of Bureau of Labor Relations.
35Severance  pay schemes  are  also  not immune  from  the procyclicality  problems that
often beset publicly administered  programs.  In times  of crises,  companies  face  a liquidity
problem because of the firm's declines  in sales - and precisely at that time the likelihood  to
pay severance  benefits is the highest. This calls for requirements  to have a funded  severance
pay scheme, which poses its own enforcement problems.
4.4  Unemployment  insurance savings accounts
Description.  Under  the unemployment  insurance  savings  account  (UISA)  system,
firms  and employers  are  required  to  deposit  a fraction  of worker's  eamings  into a  special
individual  savings  account.  There  is  a need  to  make  such  programs  compulsory  because
workers,  although aware of unemployment risks, may be myopic and might not save on their
own.  Workers  may also bank on the chance that the government will provide  aid anyway to
those  who  did  not  set  aside  funds.  Upon  separation  and  regardless  of the  reason  for
separation,  workers  receive the amount  accumulated  in their  UISA.  Some programs  allow
access  to  these  accounts  for  other  reasons  too  (for  example,  health  and  education
expenditures).
In  its pure  form,  the  benefits  from the  UISA proposal  are not  funded from  general
taxes.  However,  according  to  some  proposals  (see,  for  example,  Cortazar,  1996,  and
Feldstein  and  Altman,  1998),  the  unemployed  are  able  to  draw  benefits  as  under  the
traditional  unemployment insurance,  and the government lends money to accounts where the
balance falls below zero.  At retirement,  positive balances  would be added to the individual's
retirement income, and negative balances would be forgiven.
The UISA system is still very much a new idea, althbugh in Brazil such a system has
been in place  for several  decades, and has been  introduced  by several other Latin American
countries  recently.  Uruguay  has  a  dual  public  /  private  insurance  system  which  covers,
among others, old age and unemployment  insurance.  In several Latin American countries,  all
formal sector workers are covered,  while in others coverage is limited to certain sectors.
Arguments for UISA.  It is expected that by intemalizing the costs of unemployment
benefits,  the  system  avoids  the  moral  hazard  inherent  in  the  traditional  unemployment
insurance/unemployment  assistance  schemes;  given  the  weak  monitoring  capacity  of the
Philippines, this is a very important advantage.  Moreover, if UISA contributions are bome by
workers  (Kugler 2000 confirms this assumption for Colombia), they do not raise labor costs
36nor  push  workers  into  the  informal  sector.  17  It  has  to  be  noted  that  administrative
complexities  for the introduction of the UISAs do not stand out as prohibitive;  for example,
old-age  insurance  systems  introduced  in  many  Latin  American  countries  require  similar
information systems.
There  are  also  important  other  considerations  - having  to  do  with  the  country's
specific circumstances - that speak in favor of the introduction of UISA  systems in a country
like  the Philippines.  First, being payable  also in cases  of voluntary  separations,  the  system
would  cut  on the  litigation  costs  of severance  pay  described  above  (and encourage  labor
reallocation  at  the  same  time).  Second,  under  the  traditional  UI  system,  employers  often
cheat  and  do  not  pay  social  security  contributions  without  informing  the  workers.  By
transferring  money to  individual  accounts, workers  perform  monitoring  by themselves,  and
thus the UISA  effectively  avoids  this problem.  And third,  the existence of severance  pay
schemes,  and  several  other funded  schemes, would ease  the  transition  to the  UISA  system
(we elaborate  on implementation issues in a separate  subsection below).
Arguments against UISA.  There  are  also several  important shortcomings  of the  UISA
system.  First, as  noted  above,  the  UISA  system,  by  its  very  design,  does  not "pool  risk
among  individuals,  and thus  may be less  efficient  than those  that do  so  explicitly  (such  as
formal  unemployment  insurance)  or implicitly  (such  as income  support  programs  financed
from general  tax revenues)"  (de  Ferranti  et  al,  2000 p.  89).  Along the dimensions  of risk
pooling, even severance  pay schemes  could be considered to be better than UISA.18 This is
UISA's  most  serious  shortcoming.  Second,  in  countries  with a  large  informal  sector,  the
UISA beneficiaries are concentrated among the rich. As can be seen from table 4. 1, nearly 80
percent  of the  UISA  beneficiaries  in  Colombia  are  from  the  richest  quintile  of income
distribution.  Third, young workers or labor force entrants are not able to accumulate  enough
savings at the time of separation  from work  to tide the  worker and his household  over the
17  In principle,  while some  of the burden  of accumulating  an individual  account can  nominally  be assigned  to
the employer, the extent to which the employer  bears this cost in actuality depends on the firm's price elasticity
of demand  for the services of specific  employees. The  higher the firm  specific skills of the worker,  the smaller
the  likelihood  that  funds  that go  into workers'  individual  saving accounts  will merely  be  deducted  from the
wages and salaries of the workers.
18  But note that under some proposals  (such as Feldstein and Altman,  1998), distributive properties of UISA  are
no worse  than under the traditional  UI system,  because  under that proposal  individuals with negative  balances
would still be able to receive benefits, with similar rules of withdrawal  as under the traditional  Ul system.
37unemployment  spell.  Fourth, there  is a possibility of the ineffective  investment of publicly
managed UISA funds, based on political consideration.
Implementation issues.  The  above  objections  need not  be  fatal  to  the  proposal  for
introducing  UISA in the Philippines.  Hybrid arrangements  can be conceived that correspond
to the preference of the stakeholders  regarding  risk pooling.  In fact, several  features of the
Philippine  economy make the introduction of the UISA  system an attractive  option that can
be gradually introduced  to different sectors.
First, the introduction of the UISA scheme could be linked to merging of the existing
severance  pay  scheme  and  with  other  schemes  (for  example,  with  Pag-IBIG  and  Social
Security)  to  offer  government-managed  comprehensive  savings  account.  The  burden  on
employers  need  not  increase  much,  which  should  make  them  more  amenable  to  the
introduction  of this  new program.  A  comprehensive  account would  also provide  insurance
more  effectively  - currently,  each  program  covers  exclusively  a  particular  risk (housing,
unemployment  loan,  old  age),  which  is  sub-optimal  because  these  risks  are not  perfectly
correlated.
Second,  the  1992 private  sector retirement  pay law,  despite official misgivings  as  to
its  appropriateness,  already  provides  legal  basis  for  additional  retirement  benefits.'9 The
likelihood  that  these  benefits  are  actually  paid,  and  their  usefulness  to  workers,  would
substantially  improve  if these  entitlements  were  converted to deposits to individual  savings
accounts from which withdrawals could be made also in cases of unemployment.  Borrowing
from  one's  future  retirement  income  stream  during unemployment  spells  and replenishing
this account  automatically  during employment makes  a lot of sense if the proper  safeguards
against  myopia  are  also  implemented.  Although  there  is  still  no  clarity  as  to  the
implementing  guidelines  of the  retirement pay  law, presumably  a  mechanism  should  exist
that would allow the worker to accumulate  from each employer even  as he moves from one
place of employment to another. If it is decided that this fund should be lodged at or remitted
9 According  to the retirement pay law of 1992 (Republic  act no.  7641), "In the absence of a retirement plan or
agreement providing for retirement benefits  of employees  in the establishment,  an employee  upon reaching the
age of sixty (60) years  or more, but not beyond  sixty-five (65)  years which  is hereby declared the compulsory
retirement  age, who  has served  at least five  (5)  years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be  entitled
to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one  whole year."
38to the  SSS or other duly authorized  financial  institutions,  then it adds to the amount that the
unemployed  worker  may  draw  from  during  his  spells  of unemployment,  thus  presenting
opportunities for making the implementation  of UISA schemes easier.
Third, in the Philippines there are several programs that offer consumption smoothing.
These  programs,  some  of which are  also  funded, show that individual  savings accounts  are
not hypothetical  constructs as far as the Philippines  is concerned.  In important  ways, existing
private  and  public  programs  share  the nature  of forced  or voluntary  precautionary  savings
that workers could tap  in case of unemployment.  These programs include policy  loans from
private  life  and  non-life  insurance  companies,  Pag-IBIG  scheme,  and  emergency  loan
programn for displaced workers (see section 3.7 above).
To sum, there  are several possible  institutional  entry points for  introducing UISA  in
the Philippines  (see table  4.2).  First, the  workers  and  their employers  could  be given  the
option and inducements  to migrate  from the severance  pay scheme to a mandatory system of
UISA (the latter could be set up using the publicly funded administrative apparatus of the
Table 4.2:  Institutional entry points for introducing UISA in the Philippines*
Required Institutional  Remarks
Adjustment
Severance pay system  Conversion  of the severance pay  High level of consensus
scheme into a funded  scheme.  necessary.
Requires legislation.
1992 Retirement Law/CBAs  Issuance of implementing  rules to
create public and/or private modes
of implementing this mandate,
and limits of the withdrawal  of
funds.
SSS Emergency Loan  Scheme  Requires  issuance of new  Improvements  in current
implementing guidelines from the  beneficiary (SSS
State Insurance Fund that converts  members) tracking to
the P500 million loan from ECC  strengthen the loan
into a continuing credit line.,  collection necessary.
SSS Salary Loan  Streamlining of paper work and  SSS needs to improve  its
quicker approval of conversion  information system
from the status of "employed"  (especially regarding re-
member to self-employed  employment  status), more
member.  pro-active  loan collection.
Institution  of loan collection
schemes and continuing credit line
for a starting trust fund to avoid
cash flow problems.
39SSS).20 Severance  and retirement  schemes  could also be used to jointly build up the savings
account.  Second, the issuance of implementing  guidelines for the retirement pay law could be
an institutional innovation  to create retirement-cum-UISA  system (workers could borrow for
unemployment  insurance  purposes  when they  are  unemployed,  and  draw  old-age  pensions
when they retire. To facilitate such a transition, the expansion of the market-based  insurance
programs  should be promoted by allowing  the company to be exempted  from the mandatory
contributions  to Pag-IBIG  if it offers  its workers  other  housing and/or provident  packages
through private  insurance  firms (as  it  seems  to  be the case  with  firms that had  introduced
housing  or  provident  funds  before  the  Pag-IBIG  fund  law  was  enacted).  Third,  the
emergency  loan  program  for displaced  workers  could  be  implemented  on a  regular  basis
from  SSS.  This could have no fiscal implications for SSS, because  loans would be covered
by  the  members'  own  assets.21  Although  additional  implementation  guidelines  may  be
necessary,  the  implementation  of  this  option  seems  entirely  in  the  discretion  of  SSS
administrators.22 And  fourth,  SSS  could  extend  a  salary loan  to  the  self-employed  with  a
sufficient history of contribution. Note that the SSS has plenty of assets on the basis of which
it  can raise  liquidity.  Given  the  stringent  requirements  for eligibility - regular  payment of
contribution for several  months - the possibility that the program will benefit members who
20  In  Latin  America  (e.g.,  Colombia),  the conversion  of a  severance  pay  scheme  into  mandatory  individual
savings accounts  has spurred  the development  of insurance  firms  as suppliers  of assets that workers  may tap
during spells of unemployment.
21  Although the electronic  information  system  installed  at the  SSS permitted  the tracking of beneficiaries  who
have resumed normal employment,  loan collections,  say, through the temporary imposition of higher premia on
the loan beneficiaries,  were not implemented.
22  It  is also  possible  for  the SSS  to  give  workers  continued  access  to benefits during  unemployment  through
what seem to be only very minor adjustments in the paperwork that allow workers to automatically convert their
status  to being self-employed  upon receiving  the advance thirty-day  notice of dismissal  from  their employers.
To retain  access  to benefits,  workers  need  to continue  paying  the  small  monthly  contributions.  The  October
1999  version of the guidebook  for SSS members  explains that "a member who is separated  from  employment
should  accomplish  SSS form  E-5 for approval by the SSS.  Form E-5 is the application to continue paying SSS
contributions  and  this allows the  person to become a voluntary  member  with full  access  to benefits.  It  would
seem that if this application  and approval process does not take  place then the member is deemed ineligible  for
a salary  loan  despite  having been  a faithful  contributor  in the  immediate  past.  Once  approved as  a voluntary
member, however,  the guidelines appear to say that the unemployed worker can once more have the privilege of
a "salary  loan".  To wit:  a person is qualified  for a salary loan  if he is either  "an employed,  a currently  paying
self-employed  or voluntary  member who has paid at least 36 monthly contributions;"  and he or she must be up
to  date  in the  remittance  of  contributions  and  loan  repayments.  If this  is  right  then  the  unemployed
worker/voluntary  member  will  be  eligible  to  file  a  loan  of up  to  P15,000  or  a  smaller  amount  roughly
corresponding to what he would have received as an employed member.
40are  only  temporarily  employed  in  the  formal  sector  is small.  To reduce  the  losses, a limit
could be imposed on the loans.
Some  crucial  design  elements  for  the  above  options  need  careful  elaboration.
Important  questions  relate  to  (1)  how  to  prevent  members  from  drawing  down  their
retirement  fund beyond certain limits; (2)  how to set up a loan collection and individual fund
replenishment  system  to  maintain  the  liquidity  of an  emergency  loan  trust  fund;  and  (3)
whether  to  combine  several  contingencies  and establish  a  comprehensive  savings  account
that  covers  multiple  risks.  This  last  alternative  has important  merits,  as it  covers  several
contingencies  interchangeably  and  thus  provides  an  efficient  means  for  management  of
various  risks.  The  above  options  also  require  adequate  administrative  capacity.  Note,
however,  that  this  capacity  does  not  refer  only  to  the  ability  to  track  accessions  and
separations  of  workers,  but  also  necessarily  pertains  to  the  incentives  of  program
administrators  to assemble and use available  information to help improve  the performance  of
programs.  And  last  but not  least,  the introduction  of UISA  would  raise  serious  political
economy issues, as senior workers, for example, would not want to give up their entitlement
to a severance  pay. The Colombian transition might provide a good model for the transition
out of the severance  pay scheme (see box 4.2).
Box 4.2:  Colombia's mode of transition out of the severance  pay
The  Labor Reforn  Law of 1990  established  that  severance  funds  were to  be  deposited
annually in worker accounts at specialized  financial entities created to this end, where these funds
were to receive a market return  and where certain  partial  withdrawals  were allowed.  In this way
the  uncertainty of the labor cost was eliminated,  though  only  for new contracts.  In  fact, the law
allowed for the old  system to apply for existing  contracts,  except in the  case of free negotiations
between  workers  and  firms.  Not  too  many  workers  voluntarily  shifted  to  the  new  system.
However, because of high  worker tumover,  by mid  1994 only 20.7 percent  of the  manufacturing
sector workers and  14.5 percent of the retail  sector workers were entitled to the old severance pay
system.
Source:  Lora and Henao  (1997, pp 261-69).
4.5  Public works
Description.  Public  works  provide  low-wage  work  to  poor  individuals.  These
programs have  usually multiple objectives,  although the functions of income support and the
41construction  of infrastructure  are  usually  emphasized.  Program rules  allow  for  significant
control  of program  participation.  For  example,  they  may  favor  certain  groups  of the
population  (such as discouraged  workers or the long-term  unemployed).  Programs  may also
be used as a work test for recipients of unemployment benefits.
Public  works  are  usually  geared  toward  labor-intensive  projects.  Projects typically
implemented  include improvements  in community  social  infrastructure,  such as repairing of
schools,  hospitals,  and local  roads.  Participation  is open to anyone,  but duration  is usually
limited.  However,  setting low wages  makes  the  limited duration  feature  less  necessary,  at
least early on in program participation.  The earnings of participants are set slightly below the
market wage, since low wage triggers a self-selection  mechanism through which only those
in need participate  and stimulates the participants to search for a regular job.
There  are no public  works programs in the Philippines whose primary  objective is the
creation of employment for the vulnerable  rural population.  Existing infrastructure  programs
that only happen  to  employ  labor inputs  are,  strictly speaking,  not public  works programs.
The  objectives  of creating  jobs,  of countering  seasonality,  of employing  local  workers  -
which all characterize public works schemes - are all  secondary and not part of the design of
existing  infrastructure  schemes.  At  best,  the  programs'  administrators  try  to  maximize
employment opportunities  for workers,  whether rural  or urban, poor or non-poor,  subject to
the  constraint  of providing  the  desired  product,  for example,  delivering  certain  number  of
units of housing within a year at a given cost.
Beyond  official  intentions  to  enhance  the  ability  of infrastructure  to  employ  labor,
there as yet are no significant public works programs similar to the Maharastra program that
are  available  to  workers  upon  demand.  Most recently,  closest  to that program  is  a  small
program of the DOLE called Emergency Employment Program (see box 4.3).
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Until  the  end  of  the  year  2000  the  DOLE  was  offering  jobs  in  projects  like  repair  and
maintenance  of school  rooms;  drainage  and  waterworks  systems;  health  and day care  centers;  roads,
bridges  and irrigation  networks; as well  as reforestation,  cleanliness  and  beautification  programs.  The
workers were paid the prevailing  minimum  wage that was determined  by the regional tripartite  wage
and  productivity  boards.  In  cases  where  the municipal  govemment  directly  hired  the workers,  the
applicable  wage followed  public  sector  guidelines  and  could  have  been  sometimes  lower  than  the
minimum wage.
However,  data  show  that  public  works  compensation  was  above  the  prevailing  agricultural
wage.  The  average  compensation for actually  implemented  and  ongoing projects  from  1998  to June
2000  was  178  pesos  per  day.  This,  as  well  as  most  minimum  agricultural  wage rates  in  different
regions  around  the country,  is  higher than  the  1998 average  agricultural  wage  rate of P122  per  day
reported  in the latest Agricultural  Labor Survey of the Bureau of Agricultural  Statistics (BLES, second
quarter 2000).
A  total of 15,902  workers were  expected  to benefit  from  the EEP (Bureau  of Rural Workers,
June2000).  A worker working  for the average  project  duration of 18  days would earn  P2,000.  Under
the  EEP,  the  DOLE  pays  60  percent  of the  workers'  wages  while  the  remaining  40  percent  is
shouldered  by  the  local  government  units  and  nongovemment  organizations  involved.  Retrenched
workers avail  of the program  by registering  with the nearest Public Employment  Service Office. The
program  was  originally  conceived  as  a  safety  net  for  those  agricultural  workers  who  would  be
displaced  due to the  increased  competition  under the regime  of the  final  agreement  of the Uruguay
Round of the General  Agreements  on Tariffs and Trade. The program  budget, however, was only P40
million over three years  (1998 to 2000). Officials  at the  labor department's  Bureau of Rural Workers
contemplate the scaling up of this project.
Arguments in favor of public works.  Public works are effective  in reaching the poor
and have substantial capacity to redistribute income from the rich to the poor (see table 4.1).
Moreover,  some  other  conditions  usually  prevailing  in  developing  countries  make  public
works especially  suitable  for these  countries.  First, the  widespread informal  sector  exposes
large segments of the population to unemployment and underemployment  risk, as they do not
have access to programs available  to formal sector workers and are vulnerable  also to shocks
small  in  absolute  magnitude.  Second,  public  works  can  offer  effective  insurance  by
providing  a  quick  response  to  changes  in  circumstances  of households.  In  comparison  to
other programs, public works do not require complex administration,  so they may be quickly
set up in areas affected with various shocks.
43Table 4.1: Distribution of benefits and beneficiaries of unemployment support programs, mid-
1990s*
Poorest  2nd poorest  Middle  2nd richest  Richest
quintile  quintile  I  quintile  quintile
Unemployment  insurance/unemployment  assistance**
Average  15.4  22.3  22.5  20.0  18.9
Brazil  10.6  24.6  19.1  25.1  13.6
Bulgaria  17.8  14.9  32  13  22.4
Estonia  31.1  17.7  19.6  18  13.6
Hungary  7.8  20.4  28.2  24.6  19.1
Latvia  15.7  13.8  18  26  26.5
Poland  14.8  24.1  22.9  21.6  16.6
Slovakia  3.1  33.2  20.8  18.8  24.1
Slovenia  22.5  30  19  13.1  15.4
Severance  pay
Philippines***  I  0.2  I  5.2  |  15.3  |  22.3  |  56.9
Peru  |  4.7  9.5  28.6  33.3  23.8
Unemployment  insurance savings accounts
Colombia  0.0  4.3  n.a.  19.1  76.6
Public works
Argentina  78.6.  15.3  3.5  2.1  0.4
Training
Mexico  69.9  15.5.  8.1  5.0  1.5
Sources:  Vodopivec,  Woergoetter  and  Raju  (2001)  for  transition  economies;  de  Feranti  (2000)  for  Latin
American countries.
Notes:
*Share  of benefits  received  by  individual  quintile,  for  transition  economies,  and  share  of beneficiaries  in
population group,  for Latin American countries; percent of beneficiaries in individual  quintile, for the Philippines.
**Unemployment  insurance  benefits  include  both  payments  of unemployment  insurance  and  unemployment
assistance.
***  "Back wages" - income received by workers who have been  reinstated after  illegal dismissal by employers,
and proceeds from insurance, are taken as a proxy for severance  pay (see text).
Several  circumstances  make  public  works  an attractive  scheme  for the Philippines.
First,  the  existence  of  large  mono-crop  areas  makes  large  segmnents  of the  population
vulnerable  to  cyclical  and  structural  shocks  (see  box  4.4  on  coconut  farming).  Shocks
deriving  from geography  and climate may also  lead to a drop in income  (see above).  Public
works can effectively provide insurance for such cases, particularly since such fast responses
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A recent disastrous drought brought severe  hardship to Philippine  coconut farmers - suppliers  of 60 percent
of the world's  production  of coconut  oil  - and  exposed  their  extreme  vulnerability  to risk.  By offering
coconut  farmers  a well-designed,  flexible  public  works  program,  the  Philippine  government  could  have
significantly  mitigated  their  income  and  consumption  reduction,  and  even  improved  their  longer-term
possibilities for self-protection  and for earning non-farm  income.
Annual  income of the  majority  of an estimated  two  million coconut  farming households  is  P30,000,  well
below the official  poverty line of P70,000 per year for an average  family of six persons.  Severe  dry seasons
brought  by the El Nifno  phenomenon, the wild fluctuation  of copra prices, and the rise in the  production  of
substitutes  to coconut  oil in foreign markets  caused copra prices to drop to between P2 and P3 per kilo by
September 2000, representing  a 70 percent drop compared to the  1999 buying price of P8 per kilo.
Because  local  incomes  are low,  farmers  do  not have  opportunities  for generating non-farm  income  that do
not co-vary  with activity  in the coconut  farms.  This means that when  incomes  from farming  are  low, it is
likely that incomes from other activities are low as well. As a consequence  of  this covariance of income  risk,
households  are  much  more  limited  in  helping  each  other  through  inter-family  transfers  and  other
community-based  modes  of informal  insurance  and collective  savings.  Reduced  consumption  of essential
goods  and  investment  in  human capital,  cutting  of coconut  trees  and  slowdown  of re-planting  to replace
senile  trees,  and  the  migration  of farm  hands  into  the  urban  areas  are  among  the  most  obvious  coping
mechanisms  of affected  households  and  farm  communities.  These  have  costly  long-term  consequences  in
terms of the loss of assets, the reduction of farm productivity, and loss of human capital.
The  risks  facing  the  sector  are  both  cyclical  (because  of drought)  and  structural  (because  of emerging
substitutes  to coconut  oil,  although  coconut  oil  is still  favored  by  many international  buyers  for  its better
lauric  content).  But coconut  farmers  are  severely  limited  in  their risk  diversification  strategies  and  self-
protection.  Over half of these  farm  households  are  mono-crop  plantations;  inter-cropping  is not practiced
and  households  seldom  have  other sources  of incomes except those  activities  arising  from the harvesting,
transporting,  and semi-processing of coconuts  into copra.  These  activities also slow down  when activity in
the farms go through their seasonal  slumps,  except in areas  close to Metropolitan  centers which are able to
take advantage  of diversified  opportunities for non-farm  production.  The barriers  for risk diversification  are
the  following:  (i) the  limited  size  of the  local  market  for  non-food  products,  (ii)  the  lack  of disposable
incomes for investing into new ventures,  and (iii) high transaction  costs and losses due to spoilage  of selling
non-coconut  products  to urban markets  because  of difficult access  to urban  centers.  It  is no wonder  that
among the agricultural  crops  as well  as animal  farming,  coconut is reportedly  the least attractive  for  banks
(so  much  so that  the  secretary  of the  Department  of Agriculture  recently  proposed  a separate  financing
program for livelihood  projects  in the coconut sector.
Without  discounting  the possible  use of other  policy  instruments  (such  as  commodity  price  stabilization
programs),  an obvious  program  to reduce the exposure  to risks of coconut growers  is labor-intensive  public
works.  It would not only smooth  income streams of the very poor workers during the lean  seasons, but also
put in place the  infrastructure  needed  to improve  the linkages  to product and  labor markets in urban  areas.
This can go a long way towards reducing the barriers to income and  risk diversification  (i.e., inter-cropping)
of  households  and  communities.  Conceivably,  households  and  community  organizations  with  more
diversified  income  sources  will  also  acquire  an  enhanced  ability  to  tap  bank  credit  for  their  investment
needs.  The source of funding will  always be an issue, but because  the fluctuations  in the coconut  sector do
not necessarily  follow the fluctuations in the rest of the economy, this is less of a problem than in the case of
public works designed to respond to a generalized  slowdown of the economy.
Source:  interviews  with  Mr.  Eduardi Escueta,  administrator, and Mr.  Ruel  Rosales,  department manager,
Operations  Planning  Department, Philippine  Coconut  Authority.
45require  only limited  funding  (for  example,  only  for workers  employed  in the  farming  of
specific  agricultural  crops  hit by a drought,  typhoon or other natural  calamity).  Second,  the
cyclicality  of the workload  in  some mono-crop  areas  (coconut  farms,  for  example)  allows
labor  to  be  very  cheaply  deployed  in  non-farm  activities  in  the  non-peak  period.
Appropriately  timed  public  works  provide  an  opportunity  to  productively  engage  this
temporary  "surplus"  labor.  And  third, there  are some  institutional  features that may prove
instrmental  in fostering the use  of "labor based  equipment supported"  (LBES) methods  of
public works, the method which helps increase the program gains to the poor. (These features
are discussed in the subsection below.)
Arguments against public works.  There  are  also some  features  of public works  that
make them  less suitable  as a poverty reduction tool.  First,  high  non-wage costs reduce the
effectiveness of public works spending  in reaching the poor, as the cost of providing income
to  the  poor may  be  substantial.  (For  example,  Ravallion  [1999]  estimates  that  for  $1  of
additional  earnings of the poor,  $5 of public transfers  are needed,  partly also because of the
leakage  of the  spending  to  the  non-poor).  Second,  the  countercyclical  pattern  of funding
shows  that  it. is  difficult  to  raise  funding  during  crises  when  the  support  is  needed  most
(Wodon,  2000).  Third,  there  may  be problems  with  the maintenance  of the  infrastructure
built via public works.
Implementation issues.  In the Philippines, public works programs have  suffered from
various problems.  First,  wage  levels have been  set too  high (compare  also  Subbarao  et al,
1996).  Setting the wage at two-thirds  of the wage  in the nearest city (as  in the Argentinean
Trabajar)  is much simpler than relying primarily  on the bidding process  for small  contracts
and on the pakyaw system (more on this below) itself to discourage the non-poor participants.
Second,  there  have  been  no  well-designed,  demand-driven  mechanisms  of allocation  of
public works23. Allocation  depended  neither on counterpart  mobilization of local resources
nor  on  targeting  of  geographic  or  sectoral  poverty  and  vulnerability.  Admittedly,  the
2  An  important  lesson  from  schemes  requiring  counterpart  funds  from  local  govemments  is  that  poorer
municipalities that do not have the cash for capital  investment purposes can be  inadvertently excluded  from the
scheme. This has been the experience,  for instance, in the ongoing Agrarian  Reform Communities Development
Project of the World Bank and in a 1999-2000 road cost-sharing scheme between the league of municipalities  of
the Philippines and the Department of Public Works and Highways. In the latter, at least  17 municipalities  were
not able to access the  P1  million allocated  for them  because  the municipality could  not put  up the counterpart
fund.  Demand-driven schemes will need  to have loan facilities and schemes for non-cash counterpart resources.
46Kabuhayan program  (during  1994-96) of the  Ramos administration  was  supposed  to target
the  so-called  poorest  19  provinces  and  the  fifth  and  sixth  class  towns.  24  However,  the
regional  budget  allocations  for  infrastructure  did  not bear  this  out  (Subbarao  et  al,  1996).
Large  allocations  were  made  for  the  National  Capital  Region  and  the  adjacent,  rapidly
urbanizing regions (Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog).  These regions  account for a large
share of the population  but,  with the exception  of the  Southern  Tagalog  Region,  contribute
the least to aggregate  poverty.  Southern  Tagalog  is the only major region - both in terms of
its population  and poverty  share - that received  a large share  of financial  commitment  from
Kabuhayan 2000.
Before  Kabuhayan 2000, the other major effort to increase  labor  absorption through
rural  infrastructure  was  the  Community  Employment  and  Development. Program  (CEDP)
from  1986  to  1988.  The  program's  aim  was  to  create  employment  opportunities  for  an
estimated  1.2  million workers  by the  end of  1988.  The  program suffered  many  delays  in
project  implementation  arising  from  slow  funding  and  disbursement  procedures  and
distortion of priorities in project selection because  of political pressures (Balisacan in Quibria
1996).  Still, the program achieved quite favorable results.  A large portion (54 percent)  of the
workers  hired  under  the  program  were  unemployed  before  the  CEDP.  Fifty-four  percent
reached  by  the  programs  also  had  monthly  incomes  below  the  food  threshold,  while  82
percent  had  monthly  incomes  below  the  poverty  threshold.  Seventy-eight  percent  of the
workers  also  came  from  the  project  areas  rather  than  being  brought  in  from  outside  by
contractors  (results  of a survey of 11,086  workers by the National  Economic  Development
Authority,  1988). Although some of the elements of a successful public works scheme were
not present  (see box  4.5  below),  the emphasis  on small-scale,  and  therefore  unmechanized,
infrastructure  projects  accounts  for the success  of the program in reaching the  poor.  Small-
scale projects accounted for 70 percent of the total fund allocation  of P9.1  billion or roughly
90 percent of the approximately  53,000 projects  supported by the program.
24  The method used in identifying  the poorest  provinces is  based  on the poverty  incidence,  ignoring  differences
in the  depth  of poverty  among  the  provinces.  There  was  later  a government  shift  from  selective  provincial
targeting  in the  Ramos  government's poverty  alleviation  efforts (PAF-1)  to nationwide  municipal  targeting in
PAF-2.  Provinces  were  allotted  funds based on the  number of low  class municipalities.  According  to Reyes
and del Valle  (1998), this resulted in provinces with varying magnitudes  of poverty accorded  equal funds on the
basis of having the same number of low class municipalities.
47Engineers at the Department of Public Works and Highways qualify this past success
by noting  that emphasis  on job  creation  in the  Community  Employment  and Development
Program  in the late 80s  resulted  in very poor quality for many of the projects.25 They also
believe,  however,  that the Department  has  recently  acquired  a  much greater  organizational
capacity  in  terms  of engineers  trained  in  labor-based  technologies,  so  that  the  trade-off
between the quality and cost-effectiveness of job-creating pubic works would disappear.
Box 4. 5
A. Key  design elements  of a successful  public works scheme:  Argentina's Trabajar  program
In Argentina's  Trabajar program,  the use  of labor-intensive  approaches  is enhanced  through  incentives to
local  governments  rather than  through  instructions  to  contractors  and  engineers.  Trabajar allocates  funds
across  provinces based on the distribution of the unemployed  poor. Proposals to use the funds are made by
municipalities  and  non-government  organizations.  These  proposals  are  approved  at  the  regional  level,
based on a system of points related to poverty in the area and the merits of project. The central  government
pays for the costs of unskilled labor and the sponsoring local  units pay for the equipment,  materials,  and the
skilled  labor. The wage of the unskilled  labor is set at two-thirds of the average  wage for the poorest decile
in the capital city.  In principle there are no restrictions  on the eligibility of beneficiaries to participate in the
program,  but  in practice  there  is  rationing.  The  financing  of the  Trabajar  program  as a  matching  grant
scheme  does  not  only  induce  local  governments  to  make  use  of  more  labor;  it  also  induces  local
governments to commit to the project.
(Source: de Ferranti  et al [2000])
B. Modifications  of cost-sharing  rules along the lines of the Trabajar  program
The application  of the  Trabajar  cost-sharing  approach  to  schemes  such  as that  P1.5  billion cost-sharing
scheme  being jointly  implemented  by the  league  of mayors  (LMP) and the  DPWH  is straightforward.  In
operational terms,  this means that the national government  counterpart  will pay the mobilization  costs and
contract fees of the  labor-intensive pakyaw gangs.  Such an approach  allows for an additional  inducement
for local governments to learn and promote labor-based methods of civil works construction.
Simply put, the national  government subsidy  will not be accessible  except where labor-based  technologies
are  used  as  indicated  by  the  mobilization  of pakyaw  gangs.  This  will  promote  the  more  intensive
employment of labor not only through the choice of technology but also through the choice of project types
- e.g., priority to the maintenance and repair of feeder roads in remote areas instead of all-weather  roads in
town centers.  One political economy consideration of this proposal will, however,  need  to be made explicit:
whereas the LMP-DPWH  cost-sharing  scheme  provides each municipality  with a flat P1  million budget as
long as local officials  can mobilize the designated  counterpart  finance, there will be no such equal  sharing
of national  funds  in  the  proposed  alternative  scheme.  Perhaps  within  certain  set  limits - say,  by  using
vulnerability indicators  and municipal poverty  shares based  on existing proxy, census-based  indicators -- a
municipality's  ability  to  "fetch"  financing  from  the  national  government  will  have  to  depend  not  on  its
ability  to  put  up  counterpart  funds,  but on  its ability  to  identify  civil  works  that will  be  using pakyaw
groups.  A  financing  mechanism  such  as  the  P5  billion  a  year  Local  Government  Service  Equalization
Fund' (LGSEF) can be tapped for sustaining and scaling up such a program.
25 Interview  with Engineer Constante Llanes of the DPWH Labor-Based Unit.
48Ensuring  self-selection into public works scheme by the poor
a) The pakyaw system.  The need to comply with minimum compensation  standards is
the most  important  consideration  in wage  determination  for  public  works  schemes  in  the
Philippines such as CEDP and BRW rural works program  (Subbarao et al,  1996).  This makes
it difficult to use self-selection through low wages as a mode of targeting income transfers to
the poor. Moreover, "patronage hiring" - mayors acting as gate keepers to job opportunities -
is a prevalent  practice  among  local  chief executives.  In this  setting,  public works  schemes
can  deteriorate  into  modes  of rewarding  political  supporters,  especially  where  a  high
compensation  level attracts even the non-poor.
The  micro  institutional  framework  of the  traditional  mode of contracting  for most
small  civil  works  schemes  - pakyaw system  - in  the  Philippines  may  give  policymakers
reason for being hopeful about the prospect of public work schemes in the Philippines.  It is a
system where, potentially, competitive pressures can bid the compensation down.
The pakyaw system is a traditional  system of implementing  civil  works in instances
where  manual  labor  is  a  major  component.  Pakyaw  groups  are  formed  when  project
facilitators  convene  community  meetings  with  the  assistance  of barangay leaders.  People
known  to be  unemployed  and  underemployed  are  encouraged  to attend these  meetings  and
receive briefings on the prospective projects. The pakyaw groups provide only labor so there
are no capitalization requirements that need to be hurdled.  The system has been employed by
the  Department  of Public  Works  and  Highways  for  the  implementation  of  labor-based
projects  since  1987.  It  is  the  organizational  interface  where  public  agencies  tasked  with
implementing  labor-based public  works recruit the unemployed  and underemployed  workers
in a community
Pakyaw, or task rate system,  is  an institutional  form that has the potential  of linking
pay to labor productivity  and prevailing local  wages rather than mandated  minimum wages.
Under the pakyaw, workers  involved  in public  works projects  are  not  paid  directly  by the
government  agency but by the pakyaw leader or small  contractor.  The  compensation  is  not
based  on  the  number  of hours  worked,  but  on  the  basis  of tasks  performed  towards  the
completion  of  a  group  task.  The  pakyaw  system  is  therefore  not  a  time-based,  but  a
productivity-based  compensation  scheme.  Where pakyaw groups are selected  on the basis of
competitive bids for public works tasks, the compensation to be received  by the laborers will
49tend  towards  the  prevailing  local  wages  for  unskilled  local  workers.  In  cases  when  the
contract is merely assigned to apakyaw group, it may turn out that the task-based  rates could
be very  generous and attractive  even to the non-poor.  To improve incentives,  in such cases
implicit  wages  should  be  set  at less  than  the  official  minimum  so  that only  the  poor  are
recruited. (Incidentally,  the pakyaw system is also a direct method for implementing  the law
requiring the hiring of local labor for public works.)
Note, however, that the pakyaw system is used only for projects directly administered
and  implemented  by the  engineers  and  field  staff of public  infrastructure  agencies.  When
hiring  contractors,  the  government  loses  the  institutional  handles  for  ensuring  LBES
technology,  it can not ensure that laborers will be local hires.
b) Cost-sharing. One way  around  the requirement  of providing  minimum  wages  to
workers,  as well  as to ensure that projects yield large social  benefits,  is via cost-sharing  by
communities that will benefit from the infrastructure.  The local  government and the national
government contribute funds  for the materials, and the local residents  contribute either labor
or a pledge to pay  a volarizacion  charge  for future  maintenance  work.  If conceived  in this
manner and organized by local governments  as being just another manifestation of bayanihan,
then it might indeed  become  feasible to target the poor. 26 Note, however,  that the  Trabajar
program's approach  to mobilizing  local  counterpart  may be superior to those existing  in the
Philippines (e.g.,  the BRW rural  works program).  A slight modification  in the BRW design
of counterpart  finance  entails  national  government  financing  of only the  cost  of unskilled
labor,  instead  of partially  financing  both the  skilled  and unskilled  labor component  of the
project (similar modifications could be done with other existing public works programs - see
box 4.5b).  As a consequence,  the  allocation of infrastructure  funds  will also increasingly  be
demand-driven.
Special design elements  for  public works in the Philippines
a)  Emergency rural  works programs. Such  a program  should be an essential part of
the government's  repertoire  for crisis  management,  especially  where  agricultural
livelihoods  are  affected  by calamities  that  regularly visit  the  country.  The  fast-
26 "Bayanihan"  in Filipino commonly refers to collective  mutual support in rural communities whether in the
repair of irrigation ditches, harvesting of rice before the rains,  or in the festive act of men lifting a small house
onto their shoulders and moving it from one location to another.
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be  ideal vehicles  for  implementing  this  approach.  An important  reform,  in  line
with the ongoing  decentralization  scheme,  is to  develop  the  mechanism  for the
direct release of road maintenance  funds to  local  governments.  Needless  to  say,
fund availability is but one of the important ingredients of such a program.
b)  Special  grants for  hard-to-reach areas.  In  some  areas  where  the  social
preparation needed  is unavailable,  or where the local government is known to be
incapable  of mobilizing counterpart finance  for other components of project cost,
the government can provide unconditional grants.  Such local  governments eligible
for  grants  can  be  listed  and  ranked  nationally  based  on  multidimensional
indicators of susceptibility to risk and financial need.
4.6  Livelihood (self-employment)  programs
Description. Livelihood  programs  create  employment  opportunities  for the poor and
marginal  groups by offering them various services  and, above  all, access to credit.  Evidence
shows  that the  poor  generally  do  not have  access  to  bank  loans,  and  when  they  resort  to
informal  lenders,  they face  exorbitant  interest  rates  (Lamberte  et  al,  1999).  In  addressing
chronic  failures in the financial  markets,  livelihood programs provide  credit access to family
and  community-based  enterprises  using  non-government  organizations  as  conduits  to  the
beneficiaries.  From  the  perspective  of  income  support  for  the  unemployed  and
underemployed,  the  key  characteristic  of  livelihood  programs  is  that  they  are  not
unconditional,  direct  income  transfers  to the  poor.  As  with some  other  programs  (such  as
public  works  and  training),  the  targeting  of  assistance  is  mediated  by  the  effort  of the
beneficiary that reveals the need for the income transfer.
In the Philippines,  livelihood programs  have  become  one  of the cornerstones  of the
strategy of helping the poor.  In  1997,  according  to a survey  conducted by the Credit Policy
Improvement  Program,  there  were  a  total  of  86  government-managed  credit  programs
directed  to the poor.  In  1995 the "Strategy to  Fight Poverty in the Philippines" prepared  by
the  World  Bank  reports  that  the  Philippine  government  had  P  31  billion  ($1.2  billion)
available for poverty lending,  representing the combined resources of 111  government credit
programs  implemented  by  19 government  agencies.  The variety of programs  is impressive.
The administration of Joseph Estrada continued to consider credit for livelihood programs an
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National Anti-Poverty  Commission was an annual fund of P500 million intended to finance
credit for livelihood programs of the poorest families in each province.
Arguments in favor of the program. Well-designed  and properly targeted  livelihood
programs  have the possibility of reaching  the unemployed poor - self-employment  is indeed
an  important  destination  of  the  unemployed  poor.  Livelihood  programs  such  as  the
Department of Social Welfare and Development  (DSWD) SEA-K create incentives for group
savings  and  increase  the  perspective  of beneficiaries  to graduate  into  the  formal  financial
sector.  Such programs  therefore provide  important vehicles  for poor workers to self-insure.
Another  channel  through  which credit  reduces  household  vulnerability  is through  income-
and consumption-smoothing.  This occurs through the creation of non-farm  sources of income
as well as by saving part of the loan disbursed for the lean season.
One  important  advantage  of  community-based  schemes  (such  as  the  Grameen
replications)  is a superior utilization of information.  Such schemes are capable of assisting in
income-  and  consumption-smoothing  through  a  transfer  of  income  to  the  unemployed
without  the  perverse  disincentives  to  work  effort  created  by  UI  or  UA,  and  without
hampering  the  self-protection  mechanism  by  the  beneficiaries.  This  is  because  the
community and family networks  are able to use the local information  to identify prospective
participants  to whom  access to  the program  is most  important.  Moreover,  they are  able to
detect  moral  hazard  problems  - and  they  are  also  able  to  prevent  them  by  deploying
appropriate  disciplinary measures such as ostracism and milder forms of peer pressure  (e.g.,
possible  exclusion from membership  in a pakyaw group when opportunities  for employment
in public  works  come  along).  The  administrative  apparatus  of the  state  has  only  highly
imperfect and expensive substitutes to such mechanisms.
Arguments  against the program. Profitability  and  employment  creating  ability  of
livelihood  programs  may  fail  in  depressed  regions.  In  regions  far  from  urban  centers,
workers  who lose their jobs and - through livelihood  programs - take work in the  informal
non-farm,  non-factory sector only rarely earn enough to keep families above the poverty line.
In such areas,  livelihood programs are not effective  and there is scope  for introducing other
public programs.
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suffered  by  livelihood  programs.  Except  for  the  programs  of the  Department  of Social
Welfare  and Development  (DWSD)  as  well  as various  government-supported  initiatives  to
replicate  the famous Grameen  Bank model  of Bangladesh,  most programs  do not reach the
ultra-poor,  are not financially  sustainable  because of very  low repayment  rates,  and  do not
have a capacity to sustain the creation of employment.  The same report shows that politicians
are  known  to  have  had  a  significant  influence  in  choosing  beneficiaries  of past  programs
which  had  been  implemented  through  the  line  agencies  of the  government  (rather  than
through government financial institutions),  contributing to large leakages of these programs.
Under the Estrada administration,  even the DSWD's highly regarded  Self-employment
Assistance  program  (SEA-K)  was  unable  to  avoid  the  pressure  to  give  legislators  the
discretion  in the  choice  of beneficiaries.  The  flagship  credit program  for the  100 poorest
families  of the National  Anti-Poverty  Commission  (selected  from  the  four  or five poorest
municipalities  of a province  by town  mayors)  was  supposed  to  use  credit  cooperatives  as
conduits  for a P500 million annual  loan program.  However,  more than half of the conduits
and  beneficiaries  of  this  program  were  identified  at  the  discretion  of  congressional
representatives  and  senators.  For several  years  now there have  been  attempts  to rationalize
credit programs and to remove their management from non-financial government  institutions.
Recently, Lamberte  et al (1999) conducted an empirical  survey assessing the viability
of government-directed  credit programs using the criteria of outreach to the poor  and other
targeted sectors and financial sustainability.  Their results show that these programs have not
generally  performed  well.  For many  non-financial  government  agencies  that decided  to be
involved  in credit  programs,  the  expected  result  did not  materialize  despite  their  seeming
natural  advantage  over  banks  due  to  their  close  working  relations  with  their  intended
clientele.  It became  clear  from these studies that programs implemented  by government  line
agencies performed worse  than programs overseen by government financial  institutions such
as the  Land Bank and  the Development Bank of the Philippines.  President  Estrada recently
signed  an  executive  order transferring  the management of all such programs  to government
financial  institutions.
535.  Conclusions  And Policy Implications
The present  study made  an attempt  at evaluating  existing  income  support programs
for the  unemployed  in  the  Philippines,  as  well  as programs  used  for this  purpose  in  other
countries.  It provided  a systematic survey of both arguments in favor of and against a certain
program.  By placing the discussion in the framework of general risk management, effort was
made to  adopt  a holistic  view and  treat  income  support systems  for the unemployed  in the
wider context of other formal  and informal  mechanisms of social risk management.  In this
connection,  particular attention  was  devoted  to the interconnection  between  unemployment
support programs and the financial  and, above all, the labor market, the latter being of utmost
importance  for enhancing the self-protection capacity of individuals  and households.
In  the  Philippines,  as  well  as  in  the  context  of others  country,  the  question  of
choosing the right public income  support program  for the unemployed  is a multifaceted  one
that involves, among other things, the following important considerations:
1.  How well does the program respond to a country's income  shocks that individuals,
households  and  communities  are  especially  ill-prepared  to  deal  with,  such  as
economic  recessions,  structural  imbalances  caused  by  liberalization  and
globalization, and shocks arising from natural calamities?
2.  How well  does the  program  fit  into  existing  informal,  as  well  as formal,  market-
based  mechanisms  of risk  management?  For  example,  would  its  introduction
disrupt  existing  self-protection  mechanisms,  or  displace  existing  coping
mechanisms  (such as an existing system of private transfers,  especially for the non-
poor population)  that may have superior efficiency properties  to public programs?
Is the program well  attuned to the prevailing norms and culture?  Are there existing
institutions  that  can  be  "upgraded"  to provide  better  protection  and  increase  the
coverage?
3.  Is the program compatible to other public support mechanisms  and policies? Above
all,  does it promote  labor reallocation  and job creation as  sources of productivity
growth - which certainly is a superior risk-prevention  strategy?
4.  And last and certainly not least, is the program well  attuned to local circumstances
so that the program itself functions well?  For example, can it be supported with the
54existing  administrative capacity of the country?  Are there mechanisms that allow
effective ways of program selection?
Based on the discussion of the alternative programs above, it is clear that all programs
have  some  advantages  and  disadvantages  - and  that in  choosing  among  them,  there  is  no
superior  or  unambiguous  measuring  device.  A multiplicity  of programs  and  flexibility  of
their use  will most likely suit the  country better  than relying on only one program.  Having
said that, we would like to draw the  attention of the policymakers to an approach  that could
enhance  income  protection  for  the  unemployed,  as  well  as  foster  unemployment  risk
prevention mechanisms.  It is a two-prong approach,  consisting of:
1.  Individual savings accounts  - either as  unemployment  insurance  savings accounts
(UISA), or comprehensive  savings accounts  covering other  contingencies  (such  as
education,  health,  housing,  and  old  age)  as  well.  This  direction  seems  to  be
supported with a natural course  of institutional  development,  is well  attuned to the
prevailing  culture,  is  not  administratively  too  complex,  and  offers  potentially
superior efficiency properties.
2.  Public works. We suggest to explore the possibilities of the enhanced  use of public
works programs  - particularly  those  relying on  labor-based,  equipment-supported
technology.  For  workers  who  have  little  other  means  to  insure  against  the
unemployment  risk,  access  to  a  public  income  support  program  based  on  self-
selection  could  be very  beneficial.  But current  weaknesses  of these programs  (for
example,  absence  of self-selection  based  on  low  wages  and  failure  to  promote
demand-driven  mechanisms  of allocation  of public  works  via  mobilization  of
counterpart resources)  should be eliminated, and new incentive  structure  introduced,
as described  above. The more widespread  adoption of labor-based  approaches  will
hinge  not just on training  more  engineers but on the ability of reforms  to address
very  specific  institutional  impediments  (such  as  making  fund  disbursement  for
labor-based  public works before the wet season,  and widening of opportunities for
small contractors to participate  in public works).
Little  is  known  about  the  possibility  of implementing  unemployment  insurance
accounts  for  wage-workers  in  non-regular  employment.  The  problem  is  not  one  of
administrative  feasibility because  employers can remit the amounts to the workers'  accounts
55and  the workers will  have the ability to monitor such  accounts (as  SSS members  now do).
Rather,  the  program  design  elements  will  have  to  address  the  non-regular  workers'  high
discount rate,  given that they are mostly poor or near-poor.  If there is a high social  benefit
associated  when poor workers are able to save for future contingencies,  it may well be worth
providing  non-regular workers  above-market  interest  rates for savings that they  are able  to
accumulate.  If it is deemed  desirable that they purchase  other rmarket-provided  insurance  out
of such savings,  that too can be directly subsidized.
Until  key  administrative  constraints  are  removed,  and  until  stakeholders  reach  a
consensus  about  the  costs  they  are  willing  to  bear,  other  competing  options  discussed  in
section  four  seem  to  be  less  feasible.  Surely,  the  attractiveness  of  other  programs  may
increase  when  the  formal  sector  expands,  which  will  make  present  financial  and
administrative obstacles less important.
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59Table 3.7:  Social  Safety Net Programs in Recent Years
Average  Average yearly  Remarks
Annual  number of
Budget/  paticipants/ DUugets  beneficiaries
expenditure
1. Public works'
Refers only to additional jobs (of an
average duration of one month 23 working
Labor-Based  Equipment-Supported  days) that were created because  labor-
infrastructure Implemented through the Dept.  PIO billion  360,000 based, equipment supported  technology
of Public Works and Highway's labor-based  was used. Source. Engineer Constante
Llanes of Department of Public Works and
units. Includes projects of the  agrarian reform  Highways Labor-based  Unit.
and agriculture departments and league of town
mayors.  Working  an average  of 18 days,  figures
refer to annual average from  1998 to 2000.
Dept. of Labor and Employment  P21  million  5,302 Source are project reports from the Bureau
(Bureau of Rural Workers)  of  Rural  Workers.
2. Livelihood/self  employment/  P31  billion  251,861  P31 billion refers to credit available  in
1995 through  111  directed credit programs. entrepreneurship programs  By 1997 there were only 86 such programs.
Examples:  Presumably the available credit also went
of Labor and  Employment  down. The number of participants  is an Department Ol Labor ana romployrnen  average of 1996 and 1997 figures reported
Department of Trade and Industry (NGO-  by the Estrellita Asidao of  the Bureau of
Microcredit II)  15,060  Local  Employment based on data from
Department of Social  Work and  43,677  different agencies.
Community Development (SEA-K)  31,043
3. Loans and grants to displaced  persons  P 167 million  15,330  Figures refer to annual averages over three
years.  Source  Social Security System. The (Emergency Loan Fund Program, etc)  fund was P500 million and was disbursed
from 1998  to 2000
4. Training
Techrainin  icalgeducation  andSkills  P1.03billion  311,766Refers to  1998 figures. Based on numbers
*  Technical education and Skills  P1.03 bi llion  3 11,766 provided by the Institute for Labor Studies.
Development  Authority
Departpment  ofuLaboriand  Averages  for 1997 and  1998
*  Depar-tment of Labor and
Employment"  P54.5 million  19,160
5. Wage  Subsidy (Special  Program for the  P 110 million  96,557 Figures refer to  1998.  Based  on nLaubers
Employment  of Students)  provided by the Institute for Labor Studies.
6. Other poverty alleviation  measures
Rice subsidization, etc.  P400 million  NA Figures refer to year 2000
Originally, the total budget  for this program
"100  poorest families" Micro-credit  program  P206 million  15,900  was P500 million.  More than half was
(families)  converted ito congressional pork barrel.
(familie)  e rest was used  for administrative
overhead.
The  Bureau of Local Employment  reports that  in 1997,  480,834  people  were  employed  for 230 days for all
govemment  infrastructure  projects.  The  term  "public works"  is often used  for any government  infrastructure
program.
Retraining of Displaced  Industrial Workers;  Skills Training for Rural Non-Farm  Productivity; Skills Training
for Women  in  Export-Oriented  Small  and Medium  Scale Enterprises;  Skills Upgrading  of Industrial  Workers;
and training for the Rural Works Program
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How can the income support for the unemployed Filipino workers be improved? The
study analyzes both arguments  in favor of and against each of the following programs:
unemployment  insurance, unemployment assistance,  severance pay, unemployment
insurance savings  accounts, public works, and self-employment  programs. In doing so,
it addresses the following questions: How does a candidate program  interact with other
labor market  institutions? Does the program  respond to a country's income shocks such
as recessions and natural disasters?  Does the country have sufficient administrative
capacity to carry out a program? Does the program  fit into existing formal  and informal
mechanisms of social risk management?  Is  there a risk of disrupting or displacing existing
mechanisms  such as  transfers between  family members?  Is  the program  attuned to the
prevailing norms  and culture?
The study concludes that all  programs have certain advantages and
disadvantages - an  argument for the multiplicity of programs and flexibility of their
use.  Nonetheless,  to enhance income  protection for the Filipino workers, the paper
proposes a two-prong approach,  consisting of  (i) the expansion  of public works
(particularly  those relying on labor-based,  equipment-supported  technology), and (ii)
the introduction of a new program - individual savings accounts, either as
unemployment insurance savings accounts or comprehensive savings accounts covering
other contingencies as well (such  as education,  health,  housing, and old age).
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